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NOTES
Conservation
CONSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS OF

TimBER

CONSERVATION LEGISLATION

The nation's goal in forestry should be to make the forest lands
of this country capable of serving the national welfare permanently
and abundantly. With improved management and regulation the
productivity of our forest lands can be built up so that ultimately
they can supply our own future requirements on a permanent basis.
The supply of saw timber is shrinking. Many forest ranges are
rundown, and critical watershed problems exist in many areas.'
About one-tenth of the area of the United States contained saw timber suitable for lumber before World War I. Between the years
1929 and 1940 this supply was decreased by twenty percent, and a
further twenty percent decline is predicted by the year 1960.2 Recent Government studies indicate that more than one-half of the
total land in the United States has already been damaged, with fifty
1
2

REP. SEC. AGRICULTURE 120 (1949).
PETERsON, ECONoIcS 103 (1949).
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million acres rendered unfit for any future cultivation. This condition is the proximate result of the decrease in the amount of waterabsorbing timber.3
The nation must restore millions of acres of depleted forest and
range land to productivity. Timber-growing stock must be replenished. Good management and regulation of all forest lands must
be achieved. Every effort must be made to reduce waste in the
utilization of forest products. The United States Forest Service in
1947 completed a study of wastage in the utilization of wood in the
United States. It reported that of the 188,500,000 tons of wood
cut in the forests of this country each year for lumber, pulp, paper
and other commercial products, 108,900,000 tons or fifty-seven percent is burned for fuel or wasted. Logging waste alone amounts to
49,000,000 tons, or forty-five percent of the total waste. 4 Large
logging companies have been notorious in their practice of coming
into a forest area for the purpose of cutting all the valuable timber
and then "getting out." This practice has resulted in the abandonment of large areas, with the result that an enormous amount of
revenue is lost to the states each year by virtue of tax delinquency. 5
This present day crisis in regard to depleted forests is the result
of the failure of the judiciary and legislatures to take cognizance of
the overall problems.
I.
The legal concept that the Crown or Government has the power
to regulate property for the purpose of conserving the natural resources of a nation dates back to the year 1567.6 But the basic
foundation of the conservation movement was laid in the Eighteenth
Century with the genesis of the Sociological School of Jurisprudence. 7
See Note, 50 YA. L. J. 1056 (1941).
4 R P. SEc. AGRICULTURE 128 (1947).
5 Millions of acres of cut-over land which has become tax delinquent and
abandoned has been an acute problem of the Pacific Northwest, the Lake
States and parts of the South. In Oregon and Washington, the amount of forest lands thus forfeited rose from about 1,140,000 acres in 1933 to more than
1,859,000 in 1938. In three Lake States alone, tax delinquency on cut-over
forest lands rose from 6,000,000 acres in 1929 to more than 20,000,000 in 1939.
See LiERER, AmEmCA's NATuRAL WFArL
105 (1942).
8 Case of Mines, 1 P1. Comm. 310, 75 Eng. Rep. 472 (1567). More than
three centuries ago, some questions arose as to the prerogative of the Crown
over the scanty deposits of resources available. All the Judges in England were
assembled at Sergeant's Inn to consult. Their remarkable declarations of the
public interest in the nation's supply of gunpowder, even in peacetime, has
come down to us as perhaps the earliest statement in the Common Law
on the principle of conservation.
7 Pound, The Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence, 24 HARv.
L. REv. 591 (1911).
3
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This school based its philosophy on the principle that "law is not
made but is found." 8 Rather than use a historical method of approach, as did most jurists during the era preceding this school,
judges who were members of this school looked to the future as well
as the present by basing their decisions on the general welfare concept of government. These judges formulated decisions the effect of
which amounted to a growing limitation on the use of property and
the exercise of the incidents of ownership. Through the efforts of
this Sociological School of Jurists, the Nineteenth Century idea that
property rights revolved solely around the rights of the owner and
his immediate neighbor, was gradually disappearing. Limitations
were placed on the jus- utere et abutere, for to them the law was a
social institution existing for social rather than individual ends."
In the United States, the dawn of liberal thinking concerning property rights took place in the first half of the Nineteenth Century.
However, the movement did not gain any positive acceptance with
the judiciary until about the period of the administration of Theodore Roosevelt.10 The leading and most important case of this
early era of liberal thinking was set down by Justice Shaw of the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in Commonwealth v. Alger,
decided in 1851.11 This often cited decision is the first important
case in the conservation movement, since it recognized that the right
of a person to the use of his property is not an absolute right, but is
subject to certain reasonable limitations. Judge Shaw stated: 12
. . . every holder of property, however absolute and unqualified may

be his title, holds it under the implied liability that his use of it may
be so regulated, that it shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment
of others having an equal right to the enjoyment of their property,
nor injurious to the rights of the community. All property in this
commonwealth, as well that in the interior as that bordering on tide
waters, is derived directly or indirectly from the government, and held
subject to those general regulations, which are necessary to the common
good and general welfare. Rights of property, like all other social
and conventional rights, are subject to such reasonable limitations in
their enjoyment, as shall prevent them from being injurious, and to such
reasonable restraints and regulations established by law, as the legislature, under the governing and controlling power vested in them by
the constitution, may think necessary and expedient.

In spite of the Alger decision, the prevailing concept of property
during the Nineteenth Century period was decidedly individualistic.
8 Pound, The Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence, 24 HAv.
L. Prv. 606 (1911).
9 PourD, THE Spu=T or Tma CommoN LAw 197 (1921).
10 See 36 STAT. 1244 (1911); 36 STAT. 531 (1909); In re Opinion of the
Justices, 103 Me. 506, 69 Adt. 627, 19 L. R. A. (N. S.) 422 (1908).
11 61 Mass. 53, 7 Cush. 53 (1851).
12
Id. at 84.

NOTRE DAME LAWYER

This conservatism is probably best reflected in the decision of Justice
Patterson in the case of Van Home's Lessee v. Dorrance, where it
was stated: 13
. . . the right of acquiring and possessing proprty and having it protected, is one of the natural inherent and unalienable rights of man.
Men have a sense of property: Property is necessary to their subsistence, and correspondent to their natural wants and desires; its security was one of the objects that induced them to unite in society
. . . The preservation of property then is a primary object of the
social compact . . . no one can be called upon to surrender or sacrifice his whole property, real and personal, for the good of the community....

This strict property concept was gradually being driven into the
background by the ever-increasing number of cases following the
principle set down in the Alger case.. 4 By the year 1880, and for
years following, another notable change in the judicial and legislative attitude towards property took form in the idea of res publicae, and in the abandonment of the idea of res communes and res
nullius.' 5 At one time things such as wild animals, water and other
unbridled substances were held to be res communes, and following
the Roman Law, some things were said to be incapable of ownership by anyone, but their use was said to be common to all. Other
things were said to be res nullius, that is, no one owned them for
the time being, but one who took possession of them intending to
make them his own might become the owner by so doing. But by the
year 1881 courts tended to treat things as being res publicae: things
are owned by the state in trust for the people; the conservation and
socially advantageous use of things, such as natural resources, re-

quired that no one be suffered to acquire any property in them or
any property right in the use of them, but that these things should
be regulated by the state to secure the widest and most beneficial
use consistent with conserving them.' 6
The social interest in the conservation of natural resources had
come to be recognized, and a compromise was sought between the
exigencies of the social interest and the interest in the free exercise
17
of individual power and the interest in security of acquisitions.
In the last few years of the Nineteenth Century, legislatures and
courts were gradually recognizing the need for conservation legisla13

Van Home's Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 Dall. 304, 310, 1 L. Ed. 391 (1795).

See also Wilkinson v. Leland, 2 Pet. 627, 7 L. Ed. 542 (1829).
14 See Commonwealth v. Charles Bailey, 95 Mass. 541, 13 Allen 541 (1866);
Commonwealth v. Tewksbury, 52 Mass. 55, 11 Met. 55 (1846); Commonwealth v. Enoch Chapin, 22 Mass. 199, 5 Pick. 199 (1827).
15 PouND, THE SPnRIT or =HxCommoN LAW 203 (1921).
16 Geer v. State of Connecticut, 161 U. S. 519, 16 S. Ct. 600, 40 L. Ed
793 (1896); Magner v. People, 97 Ill. 320 (1881); PouND, TE SIRT OF THE
COMMON LAW 203 (1921).
17 ISE, THE UNITED STATES FOREST POLICY 1-19 (1920).
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tion.' 8 The reason for this change in attitude was that in the last
quarter of the Nineteenth Century many Americans became seriously concerned over the rapid rate at which our resources were being
dissipated. They were especially disturbed by the destruction of the
forests over large areas of the country. The agency most responsible for this exploitation was not the individual farmer, but the
lumbering and logging firms which, with abundant capital, were
able to appropriate large areas of timber land and thereby use such
timber as they pleased. This destruction of forests resulted not only
from the waste of saw timber, but also from fires and wasteful
methods of lumbering. It was a serious matter, not only because it
endangered our future supplies of lumber, but also because it tended
to increase land erosion and floods. Until 1880 legislatures had
shown an utter incapacity to deal with timber conserving measures,
and all hope for future conservation centered in the provision of the
act enabling the President to set aside forest reserves. 19 This led
eventually to the creation of the Forest Service in 1905. In 1909
President Theodore Roosevelt gave considerable impetus to the conservation movement when the Enlarged Homestead Act was passed.20
This early Twentieth Century concern over the growing need for
methods of combating the unscruplous and wasteful destruction of
the nation's natural resources, such as timber, stimulated state legislatures to enact legislation for the purpose of preserving this natural
wealth of their states. The majority of the statutes prior to 1935
involved voluntary cooperative plans. Today, state timber conservation legislation can be grouped into three major categories: (1) the
voluntary group.21 This group of statutes generally sets up a For18 At an inquiry by the Department of the Interior, Justice Brandeis said
in 1911: "The old method of distributing and developing the great resources
of the country is creating a huge privileged class which is endangering liberty.
There cannot be liberty without financial independence, and the greatest danger
to the people of the United States today is in becoming, as they are gradually
more and more, a class of employees. Shall the only question be, who is to
be the master? Resistance to such conditions is, I take it,what underlies
this conservation movement. LIas', THE BRANDEIS GUmE TO THE MODERN
WORLD 103 (1941).
19 ROBBINS, OUR LANDED HERITAGE 303 (1942).
20 36 STAT. 531 (1909). This act specified that one-fourth of the land
granted as homesteads be cultivated and that no irrigable, timber or mineral
land should be entered.
21 Alabama-ALA. CODE tit. 8 § 184 et. seq. (1940).
Connecticut-CoNN. GEN. STAT., § 3454 (1949).

Florida-FLA. STAT. § 590 (Cum. Supp. 1947).
Georgia-GA. CODE ANN. § 43-201-3 (1933).
Idaho-IDAHo CODE ANN. § 37-201 et seq. (1932).

Maine-ME. REv. STAT. c. 32, § 1 et seq. (1944).
New York-N. Y. CONSERVATON LAW § 50-6 (1941).

Virginia-Via. CODE ANN. § 10-51 et seq. (1950).
West Virgina-IV. VA. CODE ANN. §

2300 (1949).
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estry Division appointing a state forester whose duty it is to provide
private landowners with technical, educational and experimental assistance purely on the basis of voluntary cooperation. (2) indirect
22
control type of legislation by means of various taxation measures.
Many states have special methods of taxing forest lands, designed to
promote conservation. Although there is considerable variance in the
provisions for taxing forest lands in various states, the most common type of statute is the partial or total exemption of forest lands.
Such exemptions may take the form of a deferment of taxes, or the
substitution of a special type of assessment which amounts to a lowfixed valuation or low-rate specific acreage tax in lieu of general
property taxes. Other states, base the tax upon yearly yield, and
impose a stumpage or severance tax at the time of the removal of
24
the timber. 23 (3) the licensing and regulation type of group.
This type of legislation is by far the most important and progressive of the three general types. These statutes generally provide for
the issuance of permits to cut timber on private land only upon compliance with the statutory regulations by the private owner or by
the lessee of the logging rights. These regulations are reasonable
limitations on the use of forest lands in that they require the logger
to allow a certain number of trees to remain standing for reseeding purposes. This third category of legislation has provoked the
most criticism from lumbering and logging interests, and such criticism is likely to increase in the future due to the possibility of more
states passing similar legislation.
22

Alabama-A A. CODE. tit. 8, § 189 (1940).
Arkansas-ARx. Dxc. STAT. § 84-32102 (1947).
Indiana-IND. ANN. STAT. § 32-301 et seq. (Burns 1949 Repl.).
Iowa-IowA CODE § 441.14 (1946).

Michigan-MicE. STAT. ANN. § 13.98 (Henderson 1947) (Cum. Supp.
1949).

Minnesota-MiN. STAT. § 88.1 et seq. (Henderson 1945).
Mississippi-Miss. CODE ANN. § 101-3 (1942); Miss. CODE ANN.

tit.

37 § 9416 (1942).
Oregon-ORE. CouT. LAWS ANN. § 110-1001 (1940).
23

Wisconsin-Wis. STAT. § 77.01 et seq. (1947).
Alabama-ATA. CODE tit. 8, § 191 et seq. (1940).
Arkansas-ARx. Dio. STAT. § 84-2103 (1937).
California-CaL. PuB. REsOURcEs, CODE § 4850 (1944).

Florida-FiA. STAT. § 590.17 et seq. (Cum. Supp. 1947).
Massachusetts-MAss. ANN. LAws c. 132, § 40 et seq. (1933) (Cun
Supp. 1948).
Mississippi-Miss. CODE ANN. § 6046-12 (1942) (Cum. Supp. 1948).
Virginia-ViR. CODE ANN. § 10-76 (1949).

Washington-Wash. Laws 1945, c. 193, as amended by Wash. Laws 1947,
c. 218.
24 CCH STATE TAx REP. f 4501 (1948).
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II
The physical characteristics of light, air, timber and of waters
above and below the surface of the earth are such that their use is
likely to affect private owners' use and enjoyment. Consequently,
through a long line of judicial decisions, the privileges of landowners
which affect these physical substances, have been limited by the
rights of neighboring owners and members of the community. The
removal of timber may affect adjoining landowners directly or indirectly by the dwindling of seed supply and the increased run-off of
water and its consequential effects, particularly erosion.
What would seem to be on its face a combination of desirable
legal relations, actually indicates two seemingly conflicting policies
concerning timber cutting and production: the policy that individual
landowners have the right freely to cut and produce timber without
limitation; the policy that the community and state have the right to
conserve their natural resources.
Until 1908 the constitutionality of statutes regulating the use and
cutting of timber had not been passed upon by any court. The
issues had not yet been decided whether such legislation was a denial of due process of law, deprivation of property without just compensation, impairment of the obligations of contracts, or a denial of
equal protection of the laws. Although there had been no decisions
written prior to 1908 concerning the constitutionality of statutes
regulating the use of timber, a number of important decisions concerning the constitutionality of statutes regulating the drilling and
the use of oil and gas had been handed down during this period,
so as to leave the constitutionality of such statutes reasonably free
from doubt. 25 Perhaps the leading case on this question was Ohio
Oil Co. v. Indiana,2 6 where the Supreme Court of the United States
decided that, a statute making it unlawful to allow gas to escape into
the open air was constitutional. In that case the defendants raised
the common objection that such a statute was a denial of their
privilege to produce from their lands, which privilege was limited
only by the duty to refrain from committing surface nuisances. The
Court held that the state could in the public interest limit the privilege to produce, as a means of preventing waste, and as a means
of protecting the rights of the community to a more stable productive future.
25 Walls v. Midland Carbon Co., 254 U. S. 300, 41 S. Ct. 118,
276 (1920); Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U. S. 61,
337, 55 L. Ed. 369 (1911); Ohio Oil Company v. Indiana, 177 U.
S. Ct. 576, 44 L. Ed. 729 (1900); Given v. State, 160 Ind. 552, 66
(1903); Townsend v. State, 147 Ind. 624, 47 N. E. 19 (1897).
26 See note 25 supra.

65 L. Ed.
31 S. Ct.
S. 190, 20
N. E. 750
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The basis for the upholding of regulatory statutes which deal
with timber has been placed wholly within the police power of the
state, inasmuch as the term police power embraces the system of
internal regulation thereof. 2 7 The maxim sic utere tuo et aliensum
non laedas has been used in order to justify legislative action to
define the method and manner in which a person may use his
property.
In In re Opinion of the Justices,28 it was stated that it was constitutional for the legislature to enact a statute which provided for the
conservation of timber, the purpose of which was to promote the
common welfare. The Maine court declared that such a statute
would not constitute a taking of property for which compensation
must be made as required under the Fourteenth Amendment of the
Constitution of the United States. It further stated that the Fourteenth Amendment was never intended to interfere with the police
power of the state. The court stated, with reference to a certain
regulatory law, that: 29
While it might restrict the owner of wild and uncultivated lands in
his use of them, might delay his taking some of the product, might

defer his anticipated profits and even thereby might cause him some
loss of profit, it would nevertheless leave him his lands, their product,
and increase untouched, and without diminution of title, estate, or
quantity. He would still have large measure of control and large opportunity to realize values. He might suffer delay, but not deprivation.
While the use might be restricted, it would not be appropriated or
"taken" ...

The reasons which the Maine court gave for construing the Fourteenth Amendment to give wide latitude to the States in conservation
legislation were that such property is not the result of productive
labor but is derived solely from the state itself, the original owner;
and that if the owners of large tracts of lands can waste them at
will without state restriction, the state, and its people, might be hopelessly deprived of its natural wealth. The court, following the Alger
case, further stated that to allow individual landowners the unrestricted use of their land would, in effect, frustrate the end and purpose of government, which is to maintain order for the common good.
Although the above rule of property seems to represent the weight
of authority, numerically at least, there is the contrary view that the
owner of land "has the absolute right of property therein, with complete authority to use the same for any industrial purpose, and he
cannot be deprived of such right by the state without just compen27 Lawton v. Steele, 152 U. S. 133, 14 S. Ct. 499, 38 L. Ed. 385 (1894);
Dexter v. State, -Wash., 202 P. (2d) 906 (1949); State v. Pitney, 79 Wash.
608, 140 Pac. 918 (1914).
28 See note 10 supra.
29 See In re Opinion of the Justices, supra note 10, 69 Atl. at 629.
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sation, for the reason that to do so appears violative of the fourteenth
amendment. .

... 30

The Supreme Court of Montana formulated

its decision in the latter case on the grounds that if an opposing rule
should be sanctioned, there would be no limit to which a legislature
could go in the exercise of its powers. Such regulatory legislation,
according to the court, would be paternalistic in character and would
be contrary to the theory upon which our Government was formed.
In a more recent case, Judge Simpson contended, in his dissenting
opinion in Dexter v. State, that: 31
If there is a continuation of the policy as indicated in the present
law, there can be no end to final and complete control and domination of the forests and farms of every type, as well as other business
activities of the people of the state under the guise of the police
power.

There can hardly be justification for such a contention in light of the
fact that industry has grown and progressed with reasonable regulation.
In answer to the arguments propounded by the opponents of such
regulatory legislation, it is appropriate to mention the general rules
set down by Justice Holmes in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon.3 2
The problem arises in determining whether the right sought to be
regulated is subject to such regulation or prohibition, and whether in
a particular case the legislature has gone beyond its power, with
the resultant unlawful taking. It cannot be disputed that the right
of property is a right that must be protected by the state itself, and
any undue restriction on the use and enjoyment thereof is as much
"a taking for constitutional purposes as appropriating or destroying
it." 3 If a statute involves a question between the taking of private property and a proper exercise of the police power, the statute
will generally be upheld. s 4 It has been held in an Oregon case 35
that where a great amount of public opinion prevails to the effect
that a particular measure is urgently needed and necessary to the
public welfare, that opinion is an important factor and influence in
30 Gas Products Co. v. Rankin, et. al., 63 Mont. 372, 207 Pac. 993, 24
A. L. R. 294 (1922).
31 See note 27 suPra, 202 P. (2d) at 914.
32 260 U. S. 393, 43 S. Ct. 158, 67 L. Ed. 322 (1922).
33 See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, note 32 supra; Missouri Pac.
Ry. Co. v. State of Nebraska, 164 U. S. 403, 17 S. Ct. 130, 41 L. Ed. 489
(1896); Pumpelly v. Green Bay and Mississippi Canal Co., 13 Wall. 166, 20 L.
Ed. 557 (1872).
34 Gorieb v. Fox, 274 U. S. 603, 47 S. Ct. 675, 71 L. Ed. 1228 (1927);
Zahn v. Board of Public Works, 274 U. S. 325, 27 S. Ct. 594, 71 L. Ed. 1074
(1927); Levy Leasing Co., Inc. v. Seigel, 258 U. S. 242, 42 S. Ct. 289, 66
L. Ed. 595 (1922).
35 Muller v. State of Oregon, 208 U. S. 412, 28 S. Ct. 324, 52 L. Ed. $51
(1908).

NOTRE DAME LAWYER
establishing the limitations of the police power in a particular case.
However, this view is necessarily subject to the qualifications expounded by Mr. Justice Holmes in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon:
"The general rule is at least that while property may be regulated
to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized
as a taking." 36 Thus it may be concluded that the police power of
the state embraces not only the power to regulate for the purpose
of promoting the public health, the public morals and the public
safety, but also, to some extent, the power to regulate for the purpose of promoting the general prosperity of the community.
In consideration of the argument that such regulatory legislation
is an impairment of the obligations of contracts, the case of Home
Bldg. & Loan Ass'n. v. Blaisdell 37 is a clear refutation of any such
contention. In the majority opinion of that case, Justice Holmes
stated that the interdiction of statutes which indirectly impair the
obligations of contracts does not prevent the state from the exercise
of such powers as are vested in it for the promotion of the good of
the state, or which are requisite for the general good of its citizens,
though existing contracts might be affected. The economic interest
of the state, warranting the exercise of the police power must be considered in the light of the economic situation of today, not what it
was a hundred years ago.3 8 In view of this, it necessarily follows
that legislation of a regulatory nature must be aimed not for the
advantage of a particular class of individuals but for the protection of
a basic and valid interest of society.
The right of equal protection of the laws, as guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States, is
not violated by the provisions of these regulatory statutes for the
reason that this constitutional amendment has no application to
statutes passed by state legislatures under the exercise of the police
power. The Supreme Court of the United States, in Powell v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, where a proper exercise of the police
power of the state as being violative of the Fourteenth Amendment
was at issue, stated: 39
it' is settled doctrine of this court that, as government is organized for the purpose, among others, of preserving the public health and
the public morals, it cannot divest itself of the power to provide for
those objects, and that the fourteenth amendment was not designated
to interfere with the exercise of that power of the states.
36
37
38

See note 32 supra, 260 U. S. at 415.
290 U. S. 398, 54 S. Ct. 231, 78 L. Ed. 413 (1934).
See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U. S. 416, 40 S. Ct. 382, 64 L. Ed. 641

(1920).
39 Powell v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 127 U. S. 678, 48 S. Ct. 992,
32 L. Ed. 253 (1888).
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Therefore, so long as an enactment in the exercise of the police
power does not violate any other positive mandate of the constitution, the defense of equal protection of the laws is not applicable.
The problem of statutes which impose a tax on the severance of
natural resources, such as timber, has given rise to a great deal more
litigation than has the regulatory type of legislation. Since the
state legislatures may exercise a wide discretion in selecting the subjects of taxation, so long as such legislation refrains from a clear
and hostile discrimination against particular classes of persons, most
of these statutes have been held to be valid.40 In Lake Superior
Mines v. Lord,41 the Supreme Court of the United States held that
where a severance tax is imposed on the extraction of iron ore, but
not in respect to other natural resources, equal protection of the
laws was not denied, as the state legislature may reasonably treat
certain classes of property differently. Where the interests of society are being depreciated, a state may impose a tax on such detrimental use. The Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the
United States does not here require uniformity of taxation, nor does
it forbid double taxation. All that is required is that there be some
adequate and
reasonable basis for the classification made by the
42
legislature.
Some courts have viewed this type of tax as a privilege or occupation tax, and a proper exercise of the power to impose such taxes
has been given to the legislatures.4 3 The constitutional requirements
relating to the imposition of property taxes have no relation to this
type of tax.
Conclusions
In view of the foregoing facts and decisions, it is evident that
there is a growing need for more positive measures to halt the everincreasing destruction of American forests. Although legislation is
needed, it is not likely that many states will enact such legislation.
Although this detrimental condition prevails, the Federal Government lacks the constitutional power to prevent the wasteful cutting
of timber by means of regulatory control. However, it is noteworthy
that the Department of Agriculture has recommended that the Federal Government provide financial assistance to the state in applying
state regulatory laws. Such legislation would authorize the Federal
40 Oliver Iron Mining Co. v. Lord et al., 262 U. S. 172, 43 S. Ct. 526,
67 L. Ed. 929 (1923).
41 271 U. S. 577, 46 S. Ct. 627, 70 L. Ed. 1093 (1926).

42

Swiss Oil Corporation v. Shanks, 273 U. S. 407, 47 S. Ct. 393, 71 L. Ed.

709 (1927).
43 Flynn, Welch & Yates, Inc. v. State Tax Commission et al., 38 N. M.
131, 28 P. (2d) 889 (1934).
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Government to apply these laws directly on the request of the state
government. Present federal-state cooperation providing local advice
and technical assistance in forest management is reaching only a
small fraction of the more than four million owners of commercial
forest lands. Even though an expansion of this cooperative service
is much needed, additional state licensing and state regulatory systems of taxation of forest lands, although indirect in its effect, is
probably one of the most important means of inciting reforestation.
State and federal tax laws should be revised so that the private
owners will not be induced to diminish their supply of timber merely
to reduce their tax burden. Under the Internal Revenue Code of
the Federal Government, the effect of the present provisions which
deal with "gain and loss" and "depletion" seem to frustrate the ulti44
mate purpose of present conservation movements.
While constitutional protection has now been afforded the present
program, the potent force of public opinion cannot be overlooked.
Those entrusted with the carrying out of the legislative will cannot
afford to disregard the property rights of the individual in the interest of controlled regulation, without the risk of defeating the entire
objective.
William G. Greif
Louis Albert Hafner

Domestic Relations
RECOVERY OF ANTENUPTIAL GIFTS UNDER THE HEART BALm
STATUTES

Under the common law's theory of redress for every recognized
wrong, there arose the actions for breach of marriage promise, alienation of affections, criminal conversation, and seduction. Since the
damages flowing from these actions seldom dealt with material injury, but almost exclusively constituted salve for wounded pride and
feelings, the recovery became known as "heart balm." That these
actions with their obvious "jury appeal" and comcomitant speculative damages became nefarious tools of the unscrupulous is well attested to by the so-called "scandal sheets" bizarre handling of some
44
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of the more prominent and lurid trials.' The sordid trials that accompanied these actions became sledgehammers of blackmail to
coerce the withdrawing partner into handsome out-of-court settlements, regardless of guilt or innocence, since the accusations and
testimony were an indelible stain upon even the most innocent.
Naturally, in time, the public's revulsion to this legally sanctioned
blackmail gelled into legislative correction, which has been popularly
termed the "heart balm" statutes. These enactments were designed
to prevent fraud, blackmail, and perjury that generally were integral
constituents of the typical action by the rejected suitor or the
spurned paramour. The statutes attempted to remove these abuses
by completely abolishing actions for damages for mental suffering
occasioned by a breach of promise to marry.
After the initial enactment 2 in 1935 of a heart balm statute by
Indiana, several other states 3 immediately followed with identical or
similar legislation. Since then, however, there has been a somewhat
more cautious approach to the adoption of these statutes because of
certain unanticipated judicial construction of them.4 This construction was the prevention of the recovery of antenuptial gifts
after a promise to marry had been breached by the donee or the
parties had mutually agreed that it was all a mistake.
In the public clamour for the abolition of the heart balm actions,
the object sought was the denial of damages based upon mental suffering. Nothing was mentioned concerning any recovery of tangible
injuries, such as loss of an engagement ring by the spumed suitor.
One of the most obvious blemishes today in the field of domestic
relations is the result being accomplished under these statutes when
there has been a promise of marriage, followed by exchanges of prop1 Garmong v. Henderson, 115 Me. 422, 99 AtI. 177 (1916).
2 IND. Am. STAT. § 2.508 (Bums 1946).
3 The following states enacted heart balm statutes in 1935:
Alabama, ALA. CODE Axr. tit. 7, § 14 (1940);

Illinois, Ir:. Air. STAT. c. 38, § 246.1, 1264.2 (Smith-Hurd 1935) (unconstitutional) :
Michigan, MICH. Cowo. LAWS § 25.191 (Mason Cure. Supp. 1940);
New Jersey, N. J. Rv. STAT. § 2.39A-1 (1937);
New York, N. Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT § 61;
Pennsylvania, PA. STAT. tit. 48, § 171 (1936);
Since 1935 the following states have enacted heart balm statutes:
California, CAr. Crv. CODE § 43.5 (1941);

Colorado, CoLO. STAT. ANN. c. 24a, §§ 1-4 (Cum. Supp. 1949);
Florida, FLA. STAT. Amr. § 771.01 (Cur. Supp. 1947);

.

Maine, A. Rzv. STAT. c. 99, § 91 (1944);
Maryland, MD. AwN. CODE GN. LAWS art. 75c (Cum. Supp. 1947);
Massachusetts, MAss. AMw.LAws c. 207, § 47 A (1949) ;
Nevada, Nav. Coza. LAWS AxN. § 4071.01 (Supp. 1941);
New Hampshire, N. H. Rtv. LAws c. 385, § 11 (1942).

4

Last state to adopt a heart balm statute was Florida in 1945.
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erty, and then a subsequent breach of the promise to marry. Generally there are three views as to what disposition should be made
of these gifts given in reliance upon the contemplated marriage. The
first view is that there shall be no recovery whatsoever of any antenuptial gifts when the promise to marry has been breached, or rescinded by mutual consent. The rationale behind this is that the
statutes provide that all actions based upon the breach of promise
shall be abolished. The second view holds that the statute in no way
affects the common law rules appertaining to the recovery of gifts
made in contemplation of marriage. The adherents of this view contend that the recovery of antenuptial gifts is outside the letter and
purpose of the statutes. The third view is that all gifts given during
the engagement period shall be recoverable upon rescission by mutual
consent or breach of the promise by the donee, if such recovery is
justified under the circumstances of the case in the opinion of the
jury or court. This is an affirmative statutory provision in one
state, California. 5
The recovery of the antenuptial gifts at common law depended
upon the intent of the donor at the time the gift was made. If he
intended to make an absolute gift, then subsequent events could not
divest the donee of the gift.6 On the other hand if it could be shown

either from express declarations made at the time of the gift, or inferred from the circumstances that the gift was conditioned upon the
donee's willingness to enter into the marriage, then the gift was subject to this condition and the donee could be divested of the gift
upon nonperformance. 7 Proof of a condition undoubtedly was facilitated by the existence of an engagement; however, the mere giving
of the gift during the period of the engagement did not, as a matter
of law, entitle the rejected donor to a return of such gifts. The conditional character of the giving must be shown. 8 It was inferred that
such gifts were conditional if they were of considerable size, as bank
accounts, cars, pianos, homes, and furniture, while smaller gifts were
deemed absolute. While the magnitude of the gift would appear
pertinent, even more indicative is the nature of the article given.
Certainly a house, furniture, and, of course, an engagement ring indicate that the gift was conditionally given upon the anticipated
marriage. 9
Before considering the merits of the three aforementioned views,
a clear distinction must be drawn between the two types of breach,
5

CAL. CIv. CODE § 1590

(1941).

Robinson v. Cumming, [1742] 2 Atk. 409, 26 Eng. Rep. 646.
7 Young v. Burrell, Cary's Causes in Ch. 54; 21 Eng. Rep. 29, and cases
gathered in Cohen v. Sellar, [1926] 1 K. B. 536, 15 B. R. C. 85 (1925).
8 Richmond v. Nye, 126 Mich. 602, 85 N. W. 1120 (1901).
9 Sloin v. Levine, 11 N. J. Misc. 899, 168 A. 849 (1933).
6
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and the recission of the contract to marry. When the breach is by
the donor of the gift, there is little question that the donee may
retain the gifts.' 0 But when the donee breaches the promise, the
authorities are in conflict as to whether the gift is to be returned
or not. It is with this type of breach that this note is concerned.
Lastly, there is the situation where the parties mutually agree to
terminate the contract to marry; generally in this case the law places
the parties in status quo and allows a recovery of any gifts.
New York, ascribing to the first view prohibits recovery of any
antenuptial gifts on the judicial construction of its statute. In the
two cases 11 to reach the court of appeals of that state, the donors'
actions for the recovery of engagement gifts were summarily dismissed in memorandum decisions which held that the actions were
based upon the breach of the marriage promise, and that the statute
precluded such actions.
The first of the two cases was Andie v. Kaplan 12 in which Andie
sought to recover money and jewelry given by him to Miss Kaplan
in conjunction with their mutual promises to marry. In the complaint, Andie alleged that his former fianc6 held the goods in trust
for him because she made the promise to marry without any intention
to fulfill it. The recovery of the money and the value of the
jewelry given was attempted upon the theory of quasi-contract to
prevent unjust enrichment, and not upon the breach of the promise
to marry. However, the court of appeals, affirming the dismissal of
the action by the trial court, based its decision on the premise that
the action, even though quasi-contractual, was grounded upon the
breach of the promise to marry, and that such action was contrary
to the express prohibitions of the New York statute.
3
In the other case, Josephson v. Dry Dock Savings Institution,'
the court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a cause of action, and expressly followed the Andie decision. Here the action
was in replevin for the return of the engagement ring and two other
articles of jewelry.
Although these cases have been followed by the lower courts in
New York, it has been with express reluctance. 14 Nevertheless it is
considered the settled law of the state, and the rule is applied to all
10
11

Ibid.

Andie v. Kaplan, 288 N. Y. 685, 43 N. E. (2d) 82 (1942); Josephson v. Dry Dock Savings Institution, 292 N. Y. 666, 56 N. E. (2d) 96 (1944).
12 See note 11 supra.
Is See note 11 supra.
14 Morris v. Baird, 54 N. Y. S. (2d) 779, 780 (1945); Nichols v. Ges.
selien, 191 Misc. 641, 78 N. Y. S. (2d) 2 (1948).
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remedies, legal 15 or equitable, 16 which attempt-to recover antenuptial
gifts after there has been a breach of the promise to marry.
The reasoning underlying these decisions is that although the
statute only specifically provides that: 17
The rights of action heretofore existing to recover sums of money
as damage for . . . breach of contract to marry are hereby abolished...,

notwithstanding this apparently clear and unambigious language the
policy statement preceding this clause must be read in conjunction
with the above and intergrated within it in order to interpret the intent of the legislature. This policy clause states: 18
The remedies heretofore provided by law for the enforcement of
actions based upon . . . breach of contract to marry, having been subjected to grave abuses, causing extreme annoyance, embarrassment,
humiliation, and pecuniary damage to many persons wholly innocent
and free from any wrongdoing, who were merely the victims of circumstances, and such remedies having been exercised by unscrupulous persons for their unjust enrichment, and such remedies having furnished
vehicles for the commission or attempted commission of crime and in
many cases having resulted in the perpetration of frauds, it is hereby
declared as the public policy of the state that the best interest of the
people of the state will be served by the abolition of such remedies.
Consequently, in the public interest, the necessity for the enactment
of this article is hereby declared as a matter of legislative determination.

The rationale is that since the legislature chose the phrase "remedies . . . based upon . . . breach of contract to marry," the courts
will endeavor to carry out the express words of the policy provisions
of the statute by extending the prohibitions to any action which is
ultimately based upon the breach of the marriage promise. The actions are based upon the breach of the marriage promise, it is reasoned, since if it were not for the breach there certainly could be no injury nor resulting cause of action. 19 But is this reasoning correct?
Section 61b by its express words abolishes only the right of action
to recover money as damages for breach of the marriage promise.
Certainly the court of appeals cannot construe this section to prevent replevin of the specific article nor prevent a suit for the declaration of a constructive trust. What it abolishes is an action for
damages for mental suffering - nothing more.
15 See Josephson v. Dry Dock Savings Institution, note 11 supra; see
Nichols v. Gesselien, note 14 supra; Reinhardt v. Schuster, 192 Misc. 919,
81 N. Y. S. (2d) 570 (1948); Alberelli v. Manning, 185 Misc. 281, 56 N. Y. S.
(2d) 493 (1945).
16 See Josephson v. Dry Dock Savings Institution, note 11 supra; Morris
v. Baird, 269 App. Div. 948, 57 N. Y. S. (2d) 890 (1945); see Nichols v.
Gesselien, note 14 supra.
17 N. Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT § 61b.
18 N. Y. Civ. PRAc. Act § 61a.
19 See Andie v. Kaplan, note 11 supra. For annotation of this type of
case, see 158 A. L. R. 623 (1945).
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If the decisions of the court of appeals are not based upon Section 61b, they must either be grounded upon Section 61a, the policy
declaration, or are pure figments of judicial reason. To fall within
the obvious scope of Section 61a, the cause of action must be based
upon the breach of the marriage promise. While granting that there
would be no action unless there had been a breach of the promise,
this is far from saying that the action is based upon the breach
merely because it follows the breach. Patently, recovery should be
based upon. the unjust enrichment of the donee. The "actions based
upon the breach" phrase was intended to prevent actions such as was
brought in Sulkowski v. Szewczyk. 2 0 In this case the defendant proposed to the plaintiff and they became engaged. The defendant had
asserted that he was single when in fact he was married, and was
therefore incapable of fulfilling his promise to marry. The plaintiff
sued for false representations. Her action was properly dismissed
under the statute because it was in essence nothing more than a suit
for damages for breach of the promise based upon impossibility. It
was plainly the type of action against which the policy section of the
statute was directed.
A further reading of this policy enunciation (which must be read
as a whole) indicates that the absolute abolition of actions to recover antenuptial gifts was far from the intent of the legislature. The
section clearly points out that the remedies which it is designed to
abolish were those which had been used to the embarrassment, humiliation and pecunia'y damage of innocent persons who were the victims of circumstances; that these remedies were used by unscrupulous
persons for their unjust enrichment; and that they had furnished
vehicles for the commission of crime. Can it be said that the remedies for the recovery of antenuptial gifts caused any of the evils
which the policy statement sought to prevent? It would be preferable if the court of appeals would recognize the realities of the situation, and admit that nowhere in the heart balm statute of New
York is there any indication that it was intended to absolutely prohibit the return of antenuptial gifts.
In fact it appears that the express provisions of the policy statement as well as the provisions of Section 61b are being misinterpreted by the court of appeals. The lower courts of New York have
reluctantly followed the interpretation of the state's highest court. 2 1
Their position is summed up by the dissent in the appellate division
in the Andie case: 22
Plaintiff asserts that defendant never intended to marry him and
made the promises in order to obtain the money and jewelry. He
20
21

22

285 App. Div. 103, 6 N. Y. S; (2d) 97 (1938).
See note 14 supra.

263 App. Div. 884, 32 N. Y. S. (2d) 429 (1942).
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asked damages . . . The action, in effect, is to recover a trust fund and,
while it grows out of a breach of promise to marry, it is not for
damages for such breach. Glazer v. Klughaupt, 116 N. J. L. 507, 185 A.
8. The claim for the value of the jewelry arises out of the breach
of promise to marry, but it does not come within the spirit of the
statute. To deny recovery would be to justify an unjust enrichment
of a wrongdoer. The purpose of the new legislation was to prevent
a recovery for alleged pecuniary loss, blighted affections, wounded
pride, humiliation, and the like, against the one who violated the
promise, but not to enable the latter to receive benefits out of his
wilful act.
Similarly, in dicta in Grishen v. Domagalski, the City Court of City
of New York said: 23
Grave doubt exists as to whether the Legislature contemplated a
prohibition against an action to recover engagement rings and other
valuables actually exchanged in consideration of the mutual promise of
marriage. It does not seem just or logical that engaged couples who
pool their resources for the purpose of buying or furnishing a home
or to meet the expenses of the marriage, should have no recourse in
the event a mutual termination of the engagement results in a refusal
to redivide the money or property so involved. This is wholly different from the evil of prospective damages by way of "heart balm" for
breach of promise of marriage which the Legislature sought to forever
ban by the enactment of the legislation in question.
Thus the lower courts have been repelled by the court of appeal's

reasoning, but nevertheless they have dutifully followed it.

Their

dicta on the other hand has focused the true nature of the action
to recover the gifts. Such action is not based upon the breach of
the contract to marry, but rather upon the inequitable retention of
the gifts by the donee following the breach of the contract. A pertinent analogy might be drawn to contracts unenforceable under the
Statute of Frauds. In such case the contract is unenforceable and
there can be no action for damages for the breach thereof; however,
one of the parties thereto who has received a benefit under the unenforceable contract is liable in quasi-contract for the benefit conferred or the value thereof. 24
Certainly the common sense quasicontractual recovery is an eminently just solution where there is an
unenforceable contract under the Statute of Frauds, and it is submitted that this quasi-contractual recovery should be allowed for the

recovery of antenuptial gifts in states which have adopted the heart
balm statutes. The public policy in both instances is opposed to the
recovery of damages for the breach of the contract, but nothing is
said in either type of statute concerning the disposition of property
transferred in reliance upon the contract.
The recovery of antenuptial

gifts in

New York

state should

be universally granted where the contract has been rescinded. Where
23

24

191 Misc. 365, 80 N. Y. S. (2d) 484, 485 (1948).
WoonWARD, Tnz LAw oF QuAsi CoNTRacr § 95 (1913).
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there has been a rescission by mutual consent it cannot be asserted
that the action is based on the breach of the contract to marry since
there is no breach. Thus, the extension of Section 61a of the Civil
Practice Act to these rescission cases is manifestly unwarranted especially in view of the fact that not only has there been no breach
of the contract, but also that there is no opportunity for the fraud
and unjust enrichment sought to be prevented by the statute. Fortunately, the New York courts' decisions refusing recovery in these
rescission cases are in the minority, but they are nevertheless present. In 1943, shortly after the Andie decision, the appellate division
in Hecht v. Yarnis 25 denied an appeal of the lower court's decision
which had stated, "It is immaterial whether the agreement to marry
was breached by defendant or 'cancelled' by mutual consent."
Fortunately, this attitude of obliviousness to the manifest nature
of rescission is not general. In 1940, before the Andie decision, there
was no doubt in minds of the justices of the supreme court of New
York as to the donor's right to recover the engagement ring. In
Hutchinson v. Kernitzky the court, in allowing recovery of the ring,
said: 26
It appears without dispute that the defendant received from the
plaintiff a ring on the occasion of their engagement to be married.
It likewise appears without dispute that the engagement was either
cancelled by mutual consent or was broken by the defendant. Under
the circumstances, plaintiff was entitled to the return of the ring.

7
Shortly after the Andie decision it was held in Unger v. Hirsch
that there could be a recovery of the engagement ring where there
was a mutual rescission, since after a rescission the parties are restored to the position in which they were immediately preceding the
contract, and the claim is in no way based upon a breach of the
contract to marry.
This rule seems to be in accord with the law existing prior to the
passage of the New York statute. The rule obtaining until 1934 is
aptly stated in Wilson v. Riggs, wherein an engagement ring was
sought to be recovered: 28

In the ordinary course, when an agreement of engagement of marriage is rescinded by mutual consent, this rescission has reference to
that agreement alone, and cannot be said to comprise an abrogation
of the condition attaching to all antenuptial gifts; namely, that, if the
agreement of engagement is abrogated, all such gifts would be returned.
In such a contract the intention of the parties is primarily concerned
with the rescission of the contract of engagement, leaving the status
25 42 N. Y. S. (2d) 596 (1943), aff'd., 268 App. Div. 771, 50 N. Y. S.
(2d) 170 (1944).
26 23 N. Y. S. (2d)
650, 651, appeal denied, 260 App. Div. 1028, 24
N. Y. S. (2d) 1013 (1940).
27 180 Misc. 381, 39 N. Y. S. (2d) 965 (1943).

28

243 App. Div. 33, 276 N. Y. S. 232, 233 (1934).
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of the gifts exchanged during the period of the engagement to stand
on their own base, with the conditions intact which attached to them

at the time they were given.

In 1945, subsequent to both the Andie and Josephson cases, the
supreme court of New York allowed recovery of various gifts of
jewelry given in contemplation of marriage where the contract was
rescinded. After mentioning the rule of the Andie case, the court
said, in Spitz v. Maxwell: 29
In any event, even if there be some doubt as to the extent of the
holding by the courts upon the specific facts in each case, it seems to
me that the breach of the agreement made after the contract was
mutually cancelled and rescinded gives rise to a valid cause of action,
for the new contract has no relation whatever to the contract to
marry.

Thus the law in New York has been in a great state of flux with
no established tendency at the present time in regard to the recovery of antenuptial gifts. When a rescission is alleged, generally
there is recovery of the conditional gifts given during the engagement. If, however, the donee breaches the marriage contract the
recovery of the gifts by replevin or a quasi-contractual remedy will
probably be denied because of the weight of the decisions of the
court of appeals.
This completely confusing state of the law has not gone unnoticed
by the legislature. A bill entitled "An Act to amend the Civil Practice Act, in relation to restitution for property transferred in contemplation of marriage," was introduced in the state assembly on
January 17, 1950.
In part it reads: 80
This article shall not be deemed to prevent a court in a proper case
from granting restitution for property or money transferred in contemplation of the performance of an agreement to marry, which is not
performed.

The bill was passed by the Assembly and Senate but was vetoed
by the Governor. Since no memorandum accompanied the veto there
has been no explanation of the reason for destroying this unquestionably beneficial legislation. The passage of the bill by the legislature
more clearly than ever before demonstrates that the courts are misconstruing what the legislature had intended. The will of the people
exhibited through their representatives is also thus shown to be
opposed to the continuance of the present injustice accomplished by
the current interpretation of the effect of Section 61 of the Civil
Practice Act.
The second view-that the recovery of antenuptial gifts depends
upon whether they were absolutely or conditionally given, the com29
30

186 Misc. 159, 59 N. Y. S. (2d) 593, 595 (1945).
Assembly Int. 766, Pr. 2322.
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mon law view-is exhibited by the holdings of the courts of New
Jersey, which has a statutes' similar to that of New York. Here
the courts uniformly have permitted the recovery of all conditionally
given gifts whether the contract has been breached by the donee, or
has been mutually rescinded.
In Beberman v. SegaI 3 2 the parties were engaged when the defendant-donee broke the engagement. The plaintiff sued for the recovery of the engagement ring or the equivalent in damages. The
defendant asserted that the statute prohibited such an action. The
court in allowing recovery said: ss
The right of action which plaintiff seeks to enforce is not, in its
essence, a cause of action for damages based upon the breach of the
claimed marriage contract. Plaintiff seeks to recover a conditional gift,
not damages consequent upon a breach of respondent's alleged undertaking to marry her.

The same common sense approach is applied in Albanese v. Indelicato s4 where the plaintiff attempted to recover not only the engagement ring but also a dinner ring and a sum of money. Plaintiff
was allowed recovery of the engagement ring, but was denied relief
on the other two items, because the dinner ring was not shown to
be conditionally given, and the money, although conditionally given,
had been expended for the stipulated purpose.
In the initial case 35 following New Jersey's adoption of its heart
balm statute, it was held that a secretary, a portion of whose wages
had been withheld for over three years in contemplation of marriage
to her employer, could recover the amount withheld upon the employer's breach of the contract to marry.
These decisions well illustrate the desirable distinction which
should be drawn between the heart balm statutes' sphere of operation and the problem of the recovery of property given in contemplation of marriage. The former deals with actions for monetary
damages for mental suffering; the latter is an action to prevent unjust enrichment after a contemplated marriage is not completed. As
distinguished from the New York view, New Jersey, in following the
common law rule for the recovery of gifts, exhibits a position which
has common sense, promotes justice, and appears to coincide with
the express words of the statute.
The third view concerning the recovery of antenuptial gifts is an
express statutory provision in the Civil Code of California. To preN. J. Rav. STAT. §239A-1 (1937).
32 6 N. J. Super. 472, 69 A. (2d) 587 (1949).
83 Id. 69 A. (2d) at 587.
84 25 N. J. Misc. 144, 51 A. (2d) 110 (1947).
31

35

Glazer v. Klughaupt, 116 N. 3. L. 507, 185 AUt. 8 (1939).
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vent any judicial misinterpretation of the usual provisions of its
heart balm statute, a unique clause was enacted, which provides: 86
Where either party to a contemplated marriage in this State makes
a gift of money or property to the other on the basis or assumption
that the marriage will take place, in the event that the donee refuses
to enter into the marriage as contemplated or that it is given up by
mutual consent, the donor may recover such gift or such part of its
value as may, under all of the circumstances of the case, be found
by a court or jury to be just.

This statute represents the return of the pendulum from the extreme position of non-recovery of some New York courts to a position where gifts not recoverable at common law might well be recovered under the statute. A gift given absolutely in California during
the period when marriage is contemplated could be ordered returned
by the court or jury under this statute, since there is no mention of a
necessity of a condition attaching to the gift. Instead of retaining
only the common law grounds for the recovery of the antenuptial
gifts, California has seen fit in these instances to attempt to arrive
at justice by allowing the court or the jury to determine whether
it is equitable for the donee to retain possession of the gifts when
the promise to marry is not fulfilled through the donee's fault or
when there is a mutual rescission. It is submitted that this California solution is more flexible than the common law rule and therefore perhaps more capable of accomplishing justice as between the
parties.
In applying the statute, the court in Priebe v. Sinclair 87 permitted
recovery of the engagement ring but denied recovery of a brooch and
the value of improvements made on real estate. The court apparently
denied recovery of the last two items on the basis that the gifts, were
made not in contemplation of marriage, but were an absolute transfer of property in furtherance of the illicit cohabitation which had
taken place over a period of eleven months. It is probable that the
same result would have been reached under both of the other views.
In conclusion it is submitted that in some jurisdictions, notably
New York, the letter and the purpose of the heart balm statutes
have been ignored. This legislation, which was enacted to prevent
unjust enrichment as well as the perpetration of fraud and blackmail,
has been utilized under the judicial interpretations to cause unjust
enrichment by the prohibition of the recovery of any antenuptial gift,
even though it is the donee who has breached the promise to marry.
It is difficult to fathom the rationale beneath this unwarranted extension of the scope of these statutes. The express words of the
heart balm statutes do not call for this extension, the underlying
policy does not require it, and certainly the extension is opposed to
36 CAL. CIV. CODE §43.5 (1941).
37 90 Cal. App. (2d) 79, 202 P. (2d) 577 (1949).
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all common sense ideas of justice. To prohibit the recovery of antenuptial gifts only allows the unscrupulous to induce proposals and
consequent gifts, and then under the protection of -the courts refuse to
enter into the marriage and return gifts made in contemplation thereof.
The reason for such a rule is not indicated in the decisions applying it.
Fortunately other courts have viewed the heart balm statutes in
the true perspective of what they were enacted to prevent, and have
completely disassociated the recovery of heart balm damages from the
just and reasonable recovery of antenuptial gifts. Whether this recovery be under an affirmative statute covering all antenuptial gifts,
or under the common law proof of a conditional gift, the result attained is the nearest to complete justice that can be reached upon
the termination of these hapless engagements.
William T. Huston

Insurance
JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF AVIATION RISKS EXCLUSION CLAUSES

In the relatively short span of forty-seven years,' travel by air
has become a conventional means of transportation. As thousands
of private and commercial 2 airplanes fill the airways each day,
aviation casualties increase.3 Along with the heartaches caused the
surviving relatives of those killed in aviation disasters, many a legal
headache has resulted from the multiplicity of litigation and reversals of precedents regarding the aviation exclusion clauses in insur1 "Man flew for the first
time on December 17, 1903, when Wilbur and
Orville Wright launched themselves into the air at Kitty Hawk, North Carolina."
McMAHoN, THE WRIGHT BRoTxas 4 (1930).
2 Government statisticians estimated air travel in the United States during
1949 at about nine billion "passenger-miles." N. Y. Times, Jan. 1, 1950,
p. 5, col. 6.
3 Although 1949 was the safest year as to the number of casualties per
"passenger-mile," there were still more deaths through air travel in 1949 than
in the previous year. This of course is due to the fact that there was a great
increase in the number of persons traveling by air last year. The scheduled
airlines reported only one death for every one hundred million "passengermiles" during 1949. N. Y. Times, Jan. 1, 1950, p. 5, col. 6. The Civil Aeronautics Association estimated that the airlines had flown about 16,500,000
passengers in 1949, which is about 2,000,000 more than in 1948. N. Y. Times,
Jan. 2, 1950, p. 37, col. 1. Perhaps these statistics are helpful in understanding
the liberal interpretations which courts have given aviation exclusion clauses
in insurance policies in recent years. Today* air travel is an accepted and
common mode of transportation and the casualties resulting therefrom are
proportionately few.
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ance policies. It is the purpose of this article to point out the conflicting decisions in this field of law, and attempt to determine
whether there is any rule or test which can be applied to settle
future litigation, even if it cannot explain many of the existing
decisions.
Before any discussion of the cases can begin, it is necessary
to deal with rules of law which are well settled but have arisen as
secondary issues in many of the cases discussed herein. First, many
policies of insurance contain incontestable clauses 4 to meet with
state statutory provisions 1 stipulating that the insurer shall not contest the policy after it has been in force for a certain length of time.
It is quite often argued that such a clause conflicts with the aviation
exclusion clauses since the insurer should have no grounds for contesting a policy other than for non-payment of premiums and other
conditions expressly provided for in contestable clauses. 6 However,
in a New York case, Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Conway,7 Chief
Justice Cardozo decided that an incontestable clause meant only
".... that within the limits of the coverage the policy shall stand,
unaffected by any defense that it was invalid in its inception, or
thereafter became invalid by reason of a condition broken."
Secondly, in determining the law applicable to each case where a
conflict of laws appears, the law of the state where the policy was
written and where the premiums were paid prevails."
Throughout the cases dealing with this type of litigation there is
a reoccurrence of two important factors, ambiguity and public policy.
Courts have frequently seized upon these elements to grant recovery
to the insured's beneficiaries. Whenever the courts find what they
believe to be ambiguity existing in a policy, they apply the well
established rule of resolving all doubts against the insurance company,9 the party who drew the contract. Although none of the
courts use the phrase, public policy, in their reasoning, many of
them go out of their way to find an ambiguity where apparently
4 A typical example of an incontestable clause: ". . . the policy . . .
shall be incontestable after it shall have been in force during the life of the
insured for two (2) years from its date, except for non-payment of premiums
and except for violations of the policy relating to naval and military service
in time of war." Burns v. Mutual Ben. Life Ins. Co. of Newark, N. J., 79
F. Supp. 847 (W. D. Mich. 1948).
5 For an interesting case in point as to the statutory requirements concerning incontestable clauses, see Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Conway, 252
N. Y. 449, 169 N. E. 642 (1930).
6 Wilmington Trust Co. v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York, 177 F.

(2d) 404 (3d Cir. 1949).
7 252 N. Y. 449, 169 N. E. 642 (1930).
8 See note 6 supra.
9 Conaway v. Life Ins. Co. of Va., 148 Ohio St. 598, 76 N. E. (2d)

294 (1947).
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none exists. This procedure seems to be motivated by the general
public feeling that large insurance companies can bear the losses
better than the individual."0
There are several phrases used in aviation exclusion clauses of
insurance policies which have been construed by the courts with
conflicting results. Those treated in this article are: "participating
in aviation or aeronautics," "engaged or participating in aviation or
aeronautics as a passenger or otherwise," "fare-paying passenger"
and those dealing with members of the military services.
I.
Where the phrase "engaged" in aviation or aeronautics has been
used, there has been little conflict. From the very outset, courts have
uniformly given this phrase an occupational connotation. In 1927,
the Supreme Court of Arkansas in deciding the Benefit Ass'n. of
Railway Employees v. Hayden case,"1 held that "engaging in aeronautics" meant engaging in such as ai occupation. Passengers were
not included in this exclusion nor were passengers held to be included where the phrases "engaged in aeronautic expeditions," or
"engaged in aeronautic activity" were used. Courts in Indiana,' 2
7
15
Oklahoma,' 6 Pennsylvania,'
Florida,' 3 Missouri,' 4 New York,
West Virginia,' 8 and Wisconsin' 9 have so held. The term "engaged
by the
in . . ." has also been given an occupational2 0 connotation
22
2
United States Courts of Appeals for the Third, Sixth, ' Seventh,
10 Paradies v. Travelers Ins. Co., 183 Misc. 887, 52 N. Y. S. (2d) 290
(1944). "Public policy" appears to be the dominant factor in the determination of the cases dealt with in this article under the subject of "military
service" decisions.
11 175 Ark. 565, 299 S. W. 995 (1927).
12 Masonic Accident Ins. Co. v. Jackson, 200 Ind. 472, 164 N. E. 628
(1929).
18 Price v. Prudential Ins. Co., 98 Fla. 1044, 124 So. 817 (1929).
14 Flanders v. Benefit Assn. of Railway Employees, 226 Mo. App. 143,
42 S. W. (2d) 973 (1931).

15 Peters v. Prudential Ins. Co., 133 Misc. 780, 233 N. Y. S. 500 (1929);

accord, Hartol Products Corporation v. Prudential Ins. Co., 290 N. Y. 44,
47 N. E. (2d) 687 (1943); Lee v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 187
Misc. 221, 46 N. Y. S. (2d) 241 (1944).

16 Reed v. Home State Life Ins. Co., 186 Okla. 226, 97 P. (2d) 53 (1939).
17 Provident Trust Co. v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 316 Pa. 121, 172 Atl.
701 (1934).
18 Beveridge v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co., 120 W. Va. 266, 197

S. E. 721 (1938).
19 Charette v. Prudential Ins. Co., 202 Wis. 470, 232 N. W. 848 (1930).
20 Faron v. Penn. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 179 F. (2d) 480 (3d Cir. 1949).
21 Maver v. New York Life Ins. Co., 74 F. (2d) 118 (6th Cir. 1934).
22 Gits v. New York Life Ins. Co., 32 F. (2d) 7 (7th Cir. 1929), cert.

denked, 280 U. S. $564, 50 S. Ct. 24, 74 L. Ed. 618 (1929).
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Eighth,23 and Tenth 24 Circuits and also the federal district courts
of Michigan

25

and Illinois.26

Some of the earliest insurance policies containing aviation exclusion clauses denied liability or refused double indemnity recovery
where the insured's death resulted from "participating or in consequence of having participated in aeronautics." 27
In 1921, the New Jersey Court of Errors and Appeals 28 held
that a passenger was "participating" in aeronautics and refused
recovery to the insured's beneficiaries. The reasoning of the court
was influenced by the fact that aviation was yet in its embryonic
stage and the court merely reflected the general public opinion
that anyone who ascended in an airplane, as a pilot or passenger,
was "participating" in aeronautics, and assuming a risk. In the
same year, the Supreme Court of Florida 29 reached a similar conclusion in treating an identical provision. In 1923, the Court of
Appeals of Missouri 30 followed the reasoning of the New Jersey
and Florida courts.
In 1930, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit 31 held that an insurance agent who went up in a plane to
inspect the plane, preparatory to writing a property damage policy
for the owner of the plane, was "participating in aeronautics."
The turning point in this line of decisions came in 1934 when
the Supreme Court of Arkansas in the Martin v. Mutual Life Ins.
Co. case 3 2 held that a person who was an invited guest in an airplane was not "participating in aeronautics." However, the courts
were still reluctant to follow the precedent established by the Arkansas Supreme Court and in 1935 the Supreme Court of New
23 Goldsmith v. New York Life Ins. Co., 69 F. (2d) 273 (8th Cir. 1934),
cert. denied, 292 U. S. 650, 54 S. Ct. 860, 78 L. Ed. 1500 (1934).
24 Head v. New York Life Ins. Co., 43 F. (2d) 517 (10th Cir. 1930).
25 Irwin v. Prudential Ins. Co., 5 F. Supp. 383 (E. D. Mich. 1933).
28 Christen v. New York Life Ins. Co., 19 F. Supp. 440 (N. D. Ill.
1937).
27 Bew v. Travelers Ins. Co., 95 N. J. L. 533, 112 Atl. 859 (1921).
The
policy in this case contained an exclusion of the insurer's liability for injuries
". .. sustained by the insured while participating in or in consequence of
having participated in aeronautics."
28 See Bew v. Travelers Ins. Co., note 27 supra.
29 Travelers' Ins. Co. v. Peake, 82 Fla. 128, 89 So. 418 (1921).
30 Meredith v. Business Men's Accident Ass'n., 213 Mo. App. 688, 252
S. W. 976 (1923). "This policy does not cover any injury . . . sustained . . .
while participating in or in consequence of having participated in aeronau-

tics......
See Head v. New York Life Ins. Co., note 24 supra.
189 Ark. 291, 71 S. W. (2d) 694 (1934). This policy provided that:
.. double indemnity shall not be payable if death resulted . . . from
participation in aeronautics. .... "
3'

32
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Mexico 3s held that a guest passenger in a plane was "participating
in aviation, aeronautics ... ." The exclusion clause in this case
included the term aviation. The court emphasized the use of this
additional broader term in rendering its opinion.
In 1938, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit 34 decided that the insured was not "participating in aeronautics" when he rode in his own airplane as a passenger. This
case was granted certiorari by the Supreme Court of the United
States 35 which vacated the judgment and remanded the case for
re-determination, limiting the question to the right of the insured
to recover under the laws of New Mexico. Upon reconsideration
decision.386
of the case, the court of appeals affirmed its previous
37
This court had previously rendered similar decisions.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in 1938 in Swasey v. Massa39
chusetts Protective Ass'n.38 and Marks v. Mutual Life Ins. Co.,

ruled that a passenger does not "participate in aviation or aeronautics." This court held that the exclusion clauses in question
were ambiguous and must be construed most favorably for the insured. In the following year, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit decided the Massachusetts Protective Ass'n. -v.
Bayersdorjer case, 40 which has apparently put an end to the conflicting decisions involving the use of the word "participating . . ."
in aviation exclusion clauses. In this case the insured, a merchant,
embarked at Camden, New Jersey, for Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, as
a "fare-paying passenger." The plane crashed in a dense fog and
the insured was killed. After citing the conflicting 41interpretations of
the phrase "participating . . . ," the court stated:
We think that the later cases reflect a changing attitude towards
aviation. . . . In the early days, flight was a venture. .. . Today,
transport flying is a business . . . passengers no more participate in
the operation of their [the airlines'] planes than do passengers upon
38 Sneddon v. Massachusetts Protective Ass'n., 39 N. M. 74, 39 P. (2d)
1023 (1935). The exclusion clause in this case reads as follows: "This policy
does not cover death or other loss due to . . . or sustained as the result of
participating in aviation, aeronautics. ...."
84 Mutual Ben. Health & Accident Ass'n. v. Bowman, 96 F. (2d) 7 (8th
Cir. 1938).
85 304 U. S. 549, 58 S. Ct. 1056, 82 L. Ed. 1521 (1938).
36 99 F. (2d) 856 (8th Cir. 1938), cert. denied, 305 U. S. 611, 59 S. Ct.
70, 83 L. Ed. 389 (1938).
37 Gregory v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 78 F. (2d) 522 (8th Cir. 1935);
Sulzbacher v. Continental Casualty Co., 88 F. (2d) 122 (8th Cir. 1937).
8
96 F. (2d) 265 (9th Cir. 1938).
89 96 F. (2d) 267 (9th Cir. 1938).
40 105 F. (2d) 595 (6th Cir. 1939). "This policy does not cover death
. . . sustained as the result of participation in aviation, aeronautics or subaquatics."
41 Id. at 597.

NOTRE DAME LAWYER
a railroad train participate in operating the train. . . . The passenger
is not permitted to direct or control him [the pilot] as to how,
where or when he shall fly. . .
If it was ever true, it cannot now
be said that a fare-paying passenger on a commercial airliner "participates in aviation or aeronautics."

The United States Courts of Appeals for the Sixth,42 and Tenth 48
Circuits and the courts of Florida,4 4 Missouri, 45 New Jersey 46 and
New Mexico 47 have held that passengers are to be regarded as
"participating" in aviation or aeronautics; however, the United
States Courts of Appeals for Second, 48 Sixth,49 Eighth,5 0 Ninth 5 1
Circuits and the courts of Arkansas 52 and West Virginia 53 have
held that passengers, who in no way direct or control the operation
of the airplanes in which they fly, are not participating in aviation.
The more recent decisions have followed the reasoning of the latter
group of cases; however, the older cases appear to state the more
sound rule. There can be no doubt that the underwriters of the
policies in these cases meant to preclude passengers in airplanes
from insurance coverage when they used the phrase "participating
in aviation or aeronautics." Otherwise, the claims of the insured in
each case would be allowed and no subsequent litigation would
result. Also, it is questionable whether the average man would
consider himself covered by an insurance policy with an exclusion
clause such as this. It is submitted that the intention of the parties
to the insurance contract should be given greater consideration by
the courts.
In a further attempt to exclude passengers from recovery, insurance companies added another condition to the aviation exclusion
42 First National Bank v. Phoenix Mutual Life Ins. Co., 57 F. (2d) 731
(E. D. Tenn. 1931). Decision limited on appeal, 62 F. (2d) 681 (6th Cir.
1933). This case is distinguishable on the facts. The insured here chartered
a plane and had complete control over the flight although he did not actually
pilot the plane.
43 See Head v. New York Life Ins. Co., note 24 supra.
44 See Travelers' Ins. Co. v. Peake, note 29 supra.
45 See Meredith v. Business Men's Accident Ass'n., note 30 supra.
46 See Bew v. Travelers Ins. Co., note 27 supra.
47 See Sneddon v. Massachusetts Protective Ass'n., note 33 supra.
48 Neel v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 131 F. (2d) 159 (2d Cir. 1942).
49 Massachusetts Protective Ass'n. v. Bayersdorfer, 105 F. (2d) S95
(6th Cir. 1939).
50 See Mutual Ben. Health & Accident Ass'n. v. Bowman, note 34 supra.
51 Mutual Benefit Health & Accident Ass'n. v. Moyer, 94 F. (2d) 906
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 304 U. S. 581, 58 S. Ct. 1054, 82 L. Ed. 1543 (1938).
Also see note 39 supra.
52 Missouri State Life Ins. Co. v. Martin, 188 Ark. 907, 69 S. W. (2d)
1081 (1934); Martin v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 189 Ark. 291, 71 S. W. (2d)
694 (1934).
53 Chappel v. Commercial Casualty Ins. Co., 120 W. Va. 262, 197 S. E.

723 (1938).
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clauses previously discussed. Policies were issued containing clauses
denying liability of the insurer where the insured participates in
aviation "as a passenger or otherwise." Even today, courts have
not reached any definite conclusion or general rule as to the interpretation of this clause. The United States Courts of Appeals for
the Tenth 54 and District of Columbia Circuits 55 and the courts
of Arkansas,56 New York, 57 Pennsylvania 58 and Tennessee 59 have
held that such a clause does not limit or exclude passengers on
airplanes. On the other hand, the United States Courts of Appeals
for the Sixth 6o and Eighth 61 Circuits, the federal district courts
of Alabama, 62 California, 63 Illinois, 64 Pennsylvania 6 5 and the Supreme Court of West Virginia 6 have reached the opposite conclusion.
New York is the only jurisdiction that has indicated a trend in
the interpretation of exclusion clauses containing the addition of
the words "as a passenger or otherwise." In 1931, the New York
Court of Appeals in Gibbs v. Equitable Life Assur. SoC., 67 held that

a passenger was within the operation of the exclusion clause duo
to the fact that at the time the policy was issued travel by air
was an extraordinary and hazardous event. This case was overruled by the same court in 1943 in Hartol Products Corp. v. Prudential Ins. Co.,68 where the court stated that at the time the
policy was issued, 1930, a trip by air was not uncommon or
hazardous as it was in 1924.
In a 1948 case, Phoenix Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Flynn,69 the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
54 Day v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 83 F. (2d) 147 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 299 U. S. 548, 57 S. Ct. 11, 81 L. Ed. 44 (1936).
55 Phoenix Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Flynn, 171 F. (2d) 982 (D. C. Cir.
1948).
56 Equitable Life Assur. Soc. v. Dyess, 194 Ark. 1023, 109 S. W. (2d)
1263 (1937).
57 Funk v. New York Life Ins. Co., 60 N. Y. S. (2d) 349 (1946). Also
see note 15 supra.
58 See Provident Trust Co. v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., note 17 supra.
59 National Bank of Commerce v. New York Life Ins. Co., 181 Tenn.
299, 181 S. W. (2d) 151 (1944).
60 See Mayer v. New York Life Ins. Co., note 21 supra.
61 See Goldsmith v. New York Life Ins. Co., note 23 supra.
62 Ivy v. New York Life Ins. Co., 33 F. Supp. 841 (N. D. Ala. 1940).
68 Pacific Bridge Co. v. National Life Ins. Co., 1943 U. S. Av. R. 38

(N. D. Cal. 1942).
64 See Christen v. New York Life Ins. Co., note 26 supra.

65 National Exchange Bank & Trust Co. v. New York Life Ins. Co., 19
F. Supp. 790 (W. D. Pa. 1937).
65 See Beveridge v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co., note 18 supra.
67 256 N. Y. 208, 176 N. E. 144 (1931).
68 290 N. Y.44, 47 N. E. (2d) 687 (1943).
69 See note 55 upra.
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decided a controversy over an exclusion clause which provided "that
death of the insured resulting directly or indirectly from participating in aeronautics, as a passenger or otherwise . . . is a risk not
assumed by the Company. . . ." The court ignored the words "as
a passenger or otherwise" and looked only to the phrase "participating in aeronautics." Other courts have ignored this and other phrases
of exclusion clauses and have confined themselves to dealing only
with the "participating in aeronautics" phrase. In this way, they
have been able to arrive at practically any conclusion they desire.
In the Flynn case, for example, the court took only the words
"participating in aeronautics" from the above quoted exclusion
clause and allowed recovery where the insured was killed while a
passenger in a United States Navy plane. This court relied on
previous decisions construing the meaning of the word "aeronautics"
and held that a passenger did not "participate in aeronautics" even
though the policy exclusion clause expressly precluded passengers
from recovery. Such reasoning hardly gives any import to the intention of the parties as evidenced by the insurance contract. The
average man, when he reads his insurance policy, would not expect
coverage while traveling by air if the policy excluded the liability
of the insurance company when the insured was "participating in
aeronautics as a passenger or otherwise." (Emphasis supplied.) If
such a clause were intended to cover persons as passengers in airplanes, the insurance companies would undoubtedly require a higher
premium because of the increased risk involved. Any person who
desires insurance coverage while he is a passenger in flight can
obtain such from his insurance agent or broker by merely requesting
it and paying an additional premium.
No doubt the conflicting decisions regarding the interpretation
of the aviation exclusion clauses account for the wariness of insurance companies to litigate. In many instances, unjust or doubtful
claims against insurance companies are settled out of court. Even
though the courts' sentiments might be with the insured, an extension of policy provisions in order to give these persons coverage
does not make for sound precedents where the obvious intent of the
insurance contract does not warrant such extension. Be that as it
may, the trend in the more recent cases appears to be that passengers are not precluded from coverage even though insurance
policies contain exclusion clauses limiting the liability of the insurer
if the insured meets his death "while participating in aviation or
aeronautics as a passenger or otherwise."
Another example of an aviation clause found in insurance policies
over which some controversy has arisen is that type which does not
give coverage to the insured while engaging or participating in avia.

NOTES
tion or aeronautics "except as a fare-paying passenger." Courts
have generally given this clause a strict construction, but as yet
there is not complete harmony among the decisions rendered. In
1942, the Supreme Court of Nebraska, in the Krause v. Pacific
i1thW'ual Life Ins. Co. case, 70 held that although the insured met his
death in a crash of a T.W.A. transport plane, he was not a "farepaying passenger," since he paid only $8.00 for a "trip pass" which
would cost $94.03 at regular rate. Another court has held that
anyone whose occupation is flying, such as pilots and stewardesses, 1
cannot be considered "fare-paying passengers" while they are on
duty.
The Supreme Court of North Carolina 72 in 1934 held that an
employee who was a passenger in a plane piloted by his employer
was not a "fare-paying passenger" since no fare was paid or contemplated to be paid by either. The facts do not state whether or
not the employee was on business for the employer. If he were,
the case would probably be decided differently today since the employee whose fare is paid by his employer is considered a "farepaying passenger." In this case, the employer was not licensed to
fly passengers for hire but, by flying the employee, he in effect
paid the employee's fare without violating the conditions of his
license. In 1935, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit 73 arrived at a conclusion similar to that of the North
Carolina Court 74 by deciding that since the pilot of the plane in
which the insured was riding was not licensed to carry passengers
for hire, the insured could not be a "fare-paying passenger" even
though he had agreed to pay for the services of the pilot and the
use of the plane.
The only case not construing this exclusion clause strictly is the
case of Quinones v. Life & Casualty Co., 75 which is discussed in this
article under the subject of "military service" decisions. Briefly,
this case held that an army physician who was being transported
from one base to another in a government plane was a "fare-paying
passenger" since his employer, the Government, paid his fare.
Within the past few months, a decision in the Superior Court of
Baltimore City 7 6 held that the mere fact that the insured does not
70

141 Neb. 844, 5 N. W. (2d) 229 (1942).

71 Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Shain, 344 Mo. 276, 126 S. W. (2d)

(1939).
72

181

Padgett v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 206 N. C. 364, 173 S. E. 903

(1934).
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Halcomb, 79 F. (2d) 788 (9th Cir. 1935).
See Padgett v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., note 72 supra.
75 209 La. 76, 24 So. (2d) 270 (1945).
76 Treide v. Commercial Casualty Co., 1950 U. S. Av. R ....
(Superior
Court of Baltimore City, Jan. 19, 1950).
73
74
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physically hand money to an agent of a flying service and receive
a "ticket" in return does not deprive him of his status as a passenger.
In the instant case, the insured, a lawyer, was killed while a passenger in a plane chartered by his client. The fare, as on past occasions, was to be paid by the insured's client.
This case is unusual because it treats in detail each policy exclusion clause which was put in issue, and presents a succinct and accurate opinion of the law as it exists today in a majority of jurisdictions. In addition, the more recent exclusion provisions are covered,
such as "operated on a public schedule," "flying on a regular route,"
and "licensed transport pilot." It appears to be the first to deal with
the phrase "licensed transport pilot." The policy here used the words
"transport pilot" whereas no such rating existed under the Civil
Aeronautics Regulation at the time the policy was written. The Civil
Aeronautics Regulation did however have an "airline transport" rating. The pilot in the instant case held a "commercial pilot" license
but not an "airline transport" rating. The court reasoned that since
there was no such rating as "transport pilot" under the Civil Aeronautics regulations, the words should be interpreted in their ordinary
sense. Thus, the court allowed recovery, holding that the exclusion
clause did not apply, stating that: 77 "One reasonable interpretation of the words 'transport pilot' would seem to be a pilot 'authorized to transport passengers.'
II.

The second category of cases involves members of the military
services who were insured under policies containing an aviation exclusion clause but no standard war clause. These cases over-lap and
include others discussed herein and show a more evident conflict. In
the absence of a war clause, courts have held that the aviation exclusion clause in an insurance policy refers to civilian flying and not
to flight while the insured is in military service. 78 Other reasons have
been advanced by courts for entering judgment for the beneficiaries
of those killed while in the armed forces. One court held that an
aviation exclusion clause did not apply to members of the military
services since there was no voluntary assumption of risk by such persons. 79 This court went on to say that members of the armed forces
were required to fly by compulsion. This is not necessarily so since
the great majority of those who served in the air forces were volunteers. True, those who met the required standards were compelled
See note 76 supra.
78 Sovereign Camp, Woodmen of the World v. Compton, 140 Ark. 313,
215 S. W. 672 (1919).
79 Janco v. Hancock Mutuial Life Ins. Co., (1948) U. S. Av. R. 33 (Munic.
Ct. of Philadelphia, Penn. 1947).
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to serve in the military services, but very few were required to serve
in the air forces. Other courts have made distinctions between cases
where the insured was killed instantly in a plane crash and cases
where the pilot managed to make a successful forced landing and
was subsequently drowned or strafed.
The first case to deal with aviation exclusion clauses in reference to members of the military services was 'Woodman of the World
v. Compton.80 This case, decided in 1919, has had a great influence
upon subsequent decisions involving not only members of the armed
forces but also cases where the insured was a civilian. The insured
in the Compton case was drafted into the army and assigned to the
air forces. Subsequently, he was killed while flying. The court
reasoned that the language of the aviation exclusionary clause "...
is directed solely to persons engaged in private occupations," and
allowed recovery by the insured's beneficiaries. Since no reference
was made to members of the military services in the aviation exclusion clause, the court felt that they were not covered by said clause.
A separate clause of exclusion referred to members of armed forces,
but was not incorporated into the aviation exclusion clause. Thus,
the court felt justified in reasoning that the aviation clause did not
exclude members of the armed forces. Today, in order that such
liability be avoided, many insurance companies incorporate one exclusion clause into several others. As a result, many policies, of necessity, become extremely complex. When such complexity results,
courts are more apt to construe the policy as ambiguous and against
the insurance company.
Reasoning similar to that of the Compton case, can be found
in Paradies v. Travelers Ins. Co., 81 decided in 1944. Here, the insured was a bombardier in a military airplane on a combat mission
over Italy at the time of his death. The court allowed recovery on
the ground that the exclusion applied only to civilian flying, either
business or pleasure. There was no exclusion made in the policy for
military or naval service. The court stated: "In this case, Lieutenant
Paradies followed the colors into the shock of invasion. He is a
military casualty."
The insured, in Bull v. Sun Life Assur. Co. of Canada,82 was a
navy pilot on duty in the South Pacific when his sea plane was shot
down. He made a forced landing but was strafed while on top of
the fuselage of his plane attempting to launch a rubber life raft. The
80

See note 78 supra.

81

183 Misc. 887, 52 N. Y. S. (2d) 290 (1944).

82

141 F. (2d) 456 (7th Cir. 1944).

The policy in this case provided:

"Death as a result, directly or indirectly, of service, travel, or Right in any
species of aircraft, as a passenger or otherwise, is not a risk assumed . . .
under this policy... "
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court allowed recovery on the ground that the insured was a casualty of war rather than an aviation casualty. Emphasis was placed
on the fact that the flight of the insured had ended before he met
his death. Only two cases were cited in the majority opinion, neither
of which was in point. There was a strong dissent, however, which
relied upon Neel v. Mutual Life Ins. Co.,83 Wendorff v. Missouri
State Life Ins. Co., 84 and Blonski v. Bankers Life Co.8 5 It appears
in cases such as this where the insured disengages himself from his
plane after a crash and leaves the scene of the crash uninjured, that
the test of proximate causation should be left to the jury. Perhaps
this test has never been raised directly by the attorneys for the
insurer since they might prefer to leave their fate in the hands of a
court rather than to allow a jury to resolve the question.
In the Neel case the insured, a civilian, flew solo out over the
Atlantic and was later found afloat apart from his plane. The court
granted that the insured emerged from his plane safely and was
later drowned but denied recovery on the ground that the insured
was "participating in aeronautics" and such was the proximate cause
of his death. As a matter of law, there should be no difference in
the findings of the courts where the insured is a civilian and findings
under similar facts where the insured is a member of the armed
forces. In the absence of a military service exclusion clause, the
aviation exclusion clauses should apply equally to both civilian and
military personnel in order that some uniformity in these decisions
might be reached. Courts dealing with cases where the insured was
a civilian often cite cases involving members of the armed forces
and vice versa.
In the Wendorif case, cited by the court in the Neel case, the insured, also a civilian, was traveling from Florida to the Bahama
Islands when the seaplane in which he was a passenger developed
motor trouble and made a successful landing in the Atlantic Ocean.
Subsequently, waves capsized the plane and the insured was drowned.
The court refused recovery since death resulted from "falling from a
flying machine." Here again the problem of proximate causation
appears. Certainly the death of the insured was the result of his
flight. However, the court did not go into any penetrating discussion of the causation factor. Undoubtedly, the court's decision would
have had a more sound basis had they applied the test of proximate
causation expressly rather than by implication.
86
In 1945, the Supreme Court of Louisiana, in the Quinones case,
rendered a very questionable decision. The court allowed recovery
83
84

See note 48 supra.

85

318 Mo. 363, 1 S. W. (2d) 99 (1927).
209 Wis. 5, 243 N. W. 410 (1932).

86

See note 75 supra.
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under the following facts: The insured was an army physician being transported by the government in a government plane at the
time of his death. The issue in the case was whether or not the
insured was a "fare-paying passenger" as required by the provisions
of his policy. The court held that he was, in the light of the rule
that the passenger whose fare is paid directly or indirectly by his employer (here, the government) is a "fare-paying passenger." In the
same year, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, in deciding Hyfer
v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.,87 reached an opposite conclusion on
similar facts. Here, the insured was an army private acting as a
radio operator on an official army transport plane on a scheduled
flight at the time he met his death. The court ruled that the insured was not a "fare-paying passenger." In its opinion the court
merely stated that the Bull case s was distinguishable and that the
Compton case 89 was no authority contra, without stating any reasons.
As to the facts, the only distinguishable feature would seem to be
that in the Quinones case 90 the insured was not a crew member
whereas in the Hyfer case 91 he was. Even so, this would hardly
seem to be much of a distinction since in both cases the insured
were under orders from -their military superiors and would hardly be
considered in that class of which the average person thinks when
speaking of "fare-paying passengers." The holding-that the insured
was not a fare-paying passenger, and thus was excluded from coverage-in the Hyfer case appears to be the better rule and is followed
by the majority of courts that have dealt with this question. There
seems to be no justification for not applying this reasoning under the
facts of the Quinones case.
Burns v. Mutual Ben. Life Ins. Co., 92 is the leading case on
this point today. The insured was a passenger on an authorized
flight traveling from one post to another when his plane exploded.
The court expressly rejected the reasoning and conclusion of the
Quinones case and held: 93
The insured's transportation may have been an expense to the army,
but that fact did not make him a fare-paying passenger within the
ordinary and generally accepted meaning of that term as used in
the aviation clause of the policy.

The court in the Hyfer case 94 relied on Green v. Mutual Benefit
Life Ins. Co.95 for authority. The Green case contained facts simi87 318
88 See
89 See
90 See

Mass, 175, 61 N. E. (2d) 3 (1945).
note 82 supra.
note 78 supra.
note 75 supra.

91 See note 87 supra.
92
93

94

79 F. Supp. 847 (W. D. Mich. 1948).
Id. at 853.
See note 87 supra.

95 144 F. (2d) 55 (1st Cir. 1944).
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lar to those of the Neel,96 Wendorff, 97 and Bull 98 cases in that the
insured was a naval cadet who made a forced landing in Lake
Michigan and became separated from his life raft before he could
inflate it. The cause of death was drowning and exposure, but the
court disallowed the claim since the insured was engaged in "aerial
flight" at the time of his death. This decision is indicative of a
causation test.
The trend today in holding that an insured who makes a controlled forced landing and later meets his death is precluded from
insurance coverage by reason of an aviation exclusion clause is
probably best shown by the decision in Order of United Commercial
Travelers of America v. King.99 The insured, a Civilian Air Patrol
pilot, made an emergency landing in the Atlantic in 1943. He
emerged from his plane without serious injury and donned his life
jacket. Four and one half hours later he was found dead. The
cause of death was drowning, but recovery was denied since the
insured was "participating in aviation." The court held that there
was no ambiguity. In the same case, the lower court allowed recovery on the insured's policy, stating in part:1 00
. . . Lieutenant King arrived by way of aircraft at the -place where
he was later accidentally drowned, but he was not injured in the
arrival or in leaving the plane which had brought him there . . .
The plane had not crashed. .

.

. Service, travel, flight and participa-

tion in aviation or aeronautics in that plane had come to an end without injury to Lieutenant King ...
I find that disengagement from participation in aviation or aeronautics had taken place, and . . . it cannot be said that Lieutenant
King's death resulted from participation, as a passenger or otherwise,
in aviation or aeronautics. .

.

. His death was too remote to be

considered the result of participation in aviation or aeronautics.
The federal district court then expressly denied the theory of
proximate causation by saying that the insured's death was too
remote to be connected to his participation in aeronautics. However, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
10 1
overruled this decision stating:
By stressing particularly the insured's uninjured physical disengagement from the airplane, and coupling this with the rule of
construction that ambiguous or doubtful clauses must be resolved
against an insurer, the District Court reached the conclusion that the
exclusion clause of the policy was not applicable. We are unable
to agree with that conclusion either in reason or authority.
96 See note 48 supra.
97 See note 84 supra.
98 See note 82 supra.
99 333 U. S. 754, 68 S. Ct. 70, 92 L. Ed. 341, rehearing denied, 333 U. S.
878, 68 S. Ct. 900, 92 L. Ed. 1153 (1948).
100 65 F. Supp. 740, 747 (W. D. S. C. 1946).
101 Order of United Commercial Travelers of America v. King, 161 F. (2d)
108, 109 (4th Cir. 1947).

NOTES
The Court of Appeals here stressed the use of102the word "resulting" in the exclusion clause and went on to say:
In undertaking an aerial flight over the ocean in a land-based
plane, man must reckon with the perils of the sea which are as imminent and real as the unrelenting force of gravity .... We think
it a rather violent fiction to say that death, under such circumstances, comes from accidental drowning.
It is true that rescue, routine or fortuitous, may remove a man
from peril. But it does not follow that the failure of rescue brings

the peril that causes death.

The United States District Court of Pennsylvania in 1945
reached a similar conclusion to that of the King case, in Barringer
v. Prudential Life Ins. Co.,10 where the insured, an army major,
was on an army transport plane enroute from Puerto Rico to
Trinidad when the plane and all its occupants disappeared and
were never found. The court held that the insured met his death
while riding in an airplane and denied recovery. Here the word
"result" was used in the exclusionary clause which put the insurance company on firm ground. The causation test was not applied
expressly but might well have been with the same result.
Those cases in which the insured was killed as a result of enemy
gun fire have used a causation test by implication and have generaly allowed the insured's beneficiaries to recover on the policy
despite the presence of an aviation exclusionary clause. In 1948,
the case of Boye v. United Services Life Ins. Co.' 04 was decided
by granting recovery under an exclusion clause similar to that in
the Barringer case. The court, however, distinguished the facts of
the two cases. In this, the Boye case, the insured was the pilot of
a B-17 which was believed to have been destroyed by enemy fire
over Germany. The court held -that this was not an ordinary risk
connected with aeronautics whereas the defects of the plane in the
Barringer case was such a risk. A similar conclusion was reached
in Temmey v. Phoenix Mut. Life. Ins. Co.10 5 Here, the insured
was an aviation radioman serving aboard a navy airplane on an
authorized flight over enemy territory in the Pacific Ocean when
he met his death. The court assumed that the insured's death was
the result of enemy gun fire, and went on to say:' 0 6
It must be observed that there is no evidence whatsoever to show
that the crash resulted from any of the risks ordinarily associated
with aeronautics. . . . We, therefore, conclude that the death of the

102 Ibid.
103 62 F. Supp. 286 (E. D. Pa. 1945), af'd. 153 F. (2d) 224 (3d Cir.
1946).
104 168 F. (2d) 570 (D. C. Cir. 1948).
105 - S. D. -, 34 N. W. (2d) 833 (1948).
106 Id., 34 N. W. (2d) at 835.
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insured resulted from a war risk and not from "participating
aeronautics, as a passenger or otherwise."

in

Riche v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.10 7 is the leading case concerning members of the armed forces shot down in action. In this
case, the insured was a crew member of an air force bomber which
was destroyed by enemy anti-aircraft fire or machine gun fire from
enemy pursuit planes while on a mission over Austria. In reviewing
08
the previous cases on this point, the court stated:'
If the insured had died in an explosion of an airplane . .. , in
a crash . .. , or by reason of a situation in which he was and could
have reasonably been expected to be placed following a crash . .. ,
or even in a case where the plane never appeared at its destination
and the only likely explanation of such failure was a crash . .. ,
plaintiff could not recover. Assured's death was not the result of
any event proceeding out of [the flight of] an airplane. . . . Death
was the result of a deliberate act of a third person and was not
connected in any way with any risk ordinarily associated with aerial

flight.

In these cases involving members of the military services who
are shot down while in flight, a causal connection test could also
be applied where the policy provisions permit it. If the word "resulting" or words of similar meaning were to be used in aviation
exclusion clauses, the courts would be called upon to determine
whether or not the insured, civilian or military, met his death as
the result of travel by air. This would alleviate some of the conflicting decisions in this field of law and would also show a more
logical distinction between cases involving civilians and those involving members of the air forces.
Since the cases discussed herein under the subject of "military
service" decisions have been used as authority in cases where the
insured was a civilian, they will be of lasting value as long as similar
wording is used in exclusionary clauses. As yet, only a few courts
have attempted to distinguish between the different status of the
insured except in those cases where the plane is destroyed by
enemy gun fire.
Conclusion
There is an evident and irreconcilable conflict in the decisions
involving identical exclusion clauses; this is primarily attributable
to the fact that cases involving military crashes are used as precedent
for civilian accidents, and vice versa, when the reasoning used in
the two types of cases is entirely different. In the military cases,
the courts generally have leaned over backward in a display of sentiment to allow recovery to the survivors of the dead war hero.
On the other hand, although they are favored, civilians do not
10T
108

193 Misc. 557, 84 N. Y. S. (2d) 832 (1948).
Id., 84 N. Y. S. (2d) at 835.
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receive equivalent indulgence. The existing decisions cannot be
reconciled; future cases can only be consistently decided by not
using the military decisions as precedent, and then by applying a
standard test to both types of cases without distinction.
This universal test should be that of proximate causation. Using
this as the test to interpret the exclusion clauses, the insurer will be
able to exclude itself from liability by the use of a clause which
clearly excludes coverage when the death or injury of the insured
is proximately caused by air flight. If the flight was not the proximate cause, but some intervening factor had caused the death, the
exclusion clause would not apply.
This approach to the problem adopts the test of tort liability,
proximate causation, in the determination of contract liability. The
adoption of this norm should serve to eliminate the confusion created
by the conflicting decisions where the insured has been shot down,
or where he has been able to extricate himself from his plane only
to meet death at the hands of the surrounding elements.
Finally, it is the cardinal rule of contract law that the intent
of the parties to the contract is to control in deciding all disputes
involving -the contract. In the decisions involving the interpretation
of the aviation exclusion clauses there is a shocking lack of the
application of this axiomatic rule. The policies should be interpreted as the average policy holder would construe it. Too often,
in attempting to hold against the insurance company who wrote
the policy, the courts find ambiguity where reasonably none exists.
Maurice J. Moriarty

Torts
EMPLOYEES IN INTERSTATE COMMERCE AND THE FEDERAL
EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY ACT

The precursors of labor legislation in this country have been members of the railroad fraternity. While their trailblazing has been the
forerunner of the modem Workmen's Compensation Laws for others,
they themselves have been left with an antiquated system which has
failed to meet the needs of the changing times. The Federal Employers' Liability Act was inspired by laudable motives at a time when
remedial state legislation was in its infancy, but it has outlived its
usefulness and has become an obstacle to the fulfillment of its own
purposes.'
1 Schoene and Watson, Workmen's Compensation on Interstate Railways,
47 HARv. L. Rxv. 389, 424 (1934).
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An early demand for federal action on the subject of r.railroad
liability was prompted by the hazardous nature of railroad work and
the abuses and miscarriages of justice under the common law method
of recovery for death or injury due to company negligence. The
common law fellow servant rule and the doctrine of assumption of
risk were constant stumbling blocks in the employees' attempt to obtain industrial justice. 2 It was because of this that Congress invoked its plenary power over interstate commerce 3 to legislate on the
liability of interstate common carriers to their employees. The first
Federal Employers' Liability Act was passed in 1906, 4 and provided
that every common carrier was liable to its employees for all damages which resulted from the negligence of any of its officers, agents,
or employees, or by reason of any defect or insufficiency of its cars
or equipment. In 1907 the United States Supreme Court, in Howard
v. Illinois Central Railroad Co.,5 declared the statute unconstitutional
because it rendered the carrier liable for damages to all its employees
without discrimination between those engaged in intrastate and those
engaged in interstate commerce. This was regarded as a usurpation
of the state's reserved power over the master and servant relationship.6 The necessity for positive action in this field of tort liability
caused Congress to change the wording of the statute to conform to
the decision of the Supreme Court and to repass the legislation in the
session of 1908. 7 There were two major changes. The revised Act
applied only to interstate rail carriers, and secondly, it imposed liability only for the negligent injury or death of employees while actually engaged in interstate commerce at the time of injury. Liability without fault, which has become so prevalent in the present Workmen's Compensation laws, was not imposed on the railroad company,
and it continued to be essential for the employee to show negligence
on the part of a company employee or a defect in railroad equipment.8 (It should be noted that, since workers coming within the
2 Albertsworth and Cilella, A Proposed New Deal jor Interstate Railway
Industrial Harms, 28 ILL. L. REv. 587, 774 (1934).
3 Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 196, 6 L. Ed. 23 (1824).
4 34 STAT. 232 (1906): "That every common carrier engaged in trade or
commerce . . . between the several states . . . shall be liable to any of its
employees . . . for all damages which may result from the negligence of any
of its officers, agents or employees."
5 207 U. S. 463, 28 S. Ct. 141, 52 L. Ed. 297 (1907).
6 Id., 207 U. S. at S04. Mr. justice White states: "Concluding, as we do,
that the statute, whilst it embraces subjects within the authority of Congress
to regulate commerce, also includes subjects not within its constitutional power,
and that the two are so interblended in the statute that they are incapable of
separation, we ar- of the opinion that the courts below rightly held the statute
to be repugnant to the Constitution and nonenforceable . . .
7 35 STAT. 65 (1908), 45 U. S. C. § 51 (1946).
8 Id., which provides that ". . . every common carrier by railroad while
engaging in commerce between any of the several States or Territories . . .
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federal statute are excluded from the benefits of state Workmen's
Compensation, there can be no recovery for non-negligent injuries in
interstate commerce.9 The federal law makes no provision for such
remedy, and the state law has no jurisdiction.)
The functioning of this statute was, from the beginning, beset
with the problem of determining just when an employee was engaged
in interstate commerce. The Supreme Court, in 1913, set forth a
test to be applied in ascertaining whether an employee, in a particular case, came within 'the terms of the Act when it stated that,
"The true test always is: Is the work in question a part of -the interstate commerce in which the carrier is engaged?" 10 This test was
somewhat altered in 1916 to meet the changing needs when the same
Court, in deciding the case of Shanks v. Delaware, Lackawanna &
Western Ry., 11 stated that, "the true test of employment in such
commerce in the sense intended is, Was the employee, at the time of
the injury, engaged in interstate transportation, or work so closely
related to it as to be practically a part of it?" The use of this
vague and indecisive language failed to insure any degree of certainty in the separate tribunals of the forty-eight states. This lack
of certainty which plagued the courts and gave rise to continued
litigation was recognized by Mr. Justice McKenna in 1922 when he
said, "we are besought -to declare a standard invariable by circumstances or free from confusion by them in application. If that were
ever possible, it is not so now." 12 The passage of time emphasized
the undesirable circumstances which attended the application of the
1908 Act, for it resulted in an increase in litigation, with little corshall be liable in damages to any person suffering injury while he is employed
by such carrier in such commerce, or, in case of the death of such employee,
to his or her personal representative, for the benefit of the surviving widow
or husband and children of such employee; . . . for such injury or death resulting in whole or in part from the negligence of any of the officers, agents,
or employees of such carrier or by reason of any defect or insufficiency, due
to its negligence, in its cars, engines, appliances, machinery, track, roadbed,
works, boats, wharves or other equipment."
9 See Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line Ry. Co., 318 U. S. 54, 71, 63 S. Ct. 444,
87 L. Ed. 610 (1943), where Mr. Justice Frankfurter states, in his concurring
opinion: "But the 1939 amendment left intact the foundation of the carrier's
liability - negligence. Unlike the English enactment which, nearly fifty years
ago, recognized that the common law concept of liability for negligence is
archaic and unjust as a means of compensation for injuries sustained by employees under modem industrial conditions, the federal legislation has retained
negligence as the basis of a carrier's liability."
10 Pedersen v. Delaware, Lackawanna, and Western Ry., 229 U. S. 146,
152, 33 S. Ct. 648, 57 L. Ed. 1125 (1913).
11 239 U. S. 556, 558, 36 S. Ct. 188, 60 L. Ed. 436 (1916).
12 Industrial Accident Commission v. Davis, 259 U. S. 182, 188, 42 S. Ct.
489, 66 L. Ed. 888 (1922).
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responding advantage to the employee. 13 Over-refinements of factual
situations and petty, academic distinctions obstructed the realization
of substantial justice. 14 The impracticability of setting down a hard
and fast rule as to which employees were covered by the Act led to
such a degree of uncertainty that many persons could only determine
whether their cause should be brought under the Act by experimenting, i.e., by going to court to settle the issue; and in many instances
an adverse judgment cost the claimant his cause of action, because
the statute of limitations might bar any further litigation. 15
The growing need for remedial legislation on this subject was answered in 1939 when Congress amended the 1908 Act in an effort
to eliminate the twilight zone of federal control. It was intended
that the borderline cases should be reduced in number by the broad
language of the amendment which reads that, "Any employee of a
carrier, any part of whose duties as such employee shall be the
furtherance of interstate or foreign commerce; or shall, in any way directly or closely and substantially, affect such commerce as above set
forth shall . . . be considered as entitled to the benefits of this

17
chapter." 16 The Report of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary,
which has been employed as a means of determining the proper application of the statute, states that: "This amendment is intended to
broaden the scope of the Employers' Liability Act so as to include
within its provisions employees of common carriers who, while ordinarily engaged in the transportation of interstate commerce, may be,
at the time of injury, temporarily divorced therefrom and engaged in
intrastate operations." It appears, by this report and the statute,
that it would no longer be necessary for an employee to be engaged
in an activity "closely related" to interstate commerce in order to
maintain a suit under the Act, so long as his general duties were
in some way "the furtherance" of such commerce.', This interpretation was given to the statute in a carefully reasoned opinion by
Judge Kiley of the Third Division of the Illinois Appellate Court. 19
In that case the employee was engaged in switching intrastate cars
at the time of his injury; however, his general duties included the
switching of cars in interstate commerce. It was pointed out that: 20
13
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WORx-meNS

CoMPENsATioN

773-780 (1936).

14 McLeod v. Threlkeld, 319 U. S. 491, 495, 63 S. Ct. 1248, 87 L. Ed.
1538 (1943).

15 See note 12, supra.
16 53 STAT. 1404 (1939), 45 U. S. C. § 51 (1946).
17 SEN. REP. No. 661, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939).
18 Patsaw v. Kansas City Southern Ry., 56 F. Supp. 897 (W. D. La.
1944); Rogers v. New York, Chicago & St. Louis Ry., 328 Il. App. 123, 65
N. E. (2d) 243 (1946).
19 Ernhart v. Elgin, Joliet & Eastern Ry. Co., 337 Ill. App. 56, 84 N. E.
(2d) 868 (1949).
20 Id., 84 N. E. (2d) at 872.

NOTES
It is not possible to break up plaintiff's duties at the moment of injury. His duty then was presumably to board the car. It is inconceivable that part of a switchman's duties at a given moment can be
interstate and part intrastate. The work of a switchman does not
differ with the type of commerce . . . These operations cannot be
broken up so that one part is in interstate and one part in intrastate
commerce.
Judge Kiley, in construing the statute literally and in referring to the
Senate Report as a source of congressional intent, concluded that it
was "unnecessary to attempt the division of an immediate operation
of a workman into parts so as to determine whether any part was
in interstate commerce." 21 The switchman was held to be within
the Act. While this case would appear to be correctly decided, the
Illinois Supreme Court differed as to the proper interpretation of
the statute in affirming the decision. 2 2 The latter court stated:
We are constrained to believe that the criterion for the applicability
of the act is still the work at which the employee is engaged at the
time of his injury. While it need no longer be shown that the employee was engaged in interstate commerce at the precise moment of
his injury, it must be shown that his employment at the time was in
furtherance of interstate commerce, or that it directly or closely and
substantially affected such commerce.
The state supreme court, in reaching this conclusion, seemed to attach
little importance to the Senate Report 2 3 which has so frequently

been referred to in other litigation concerning the amendment.

In-

stead it chose to expand the area of those activities which are said
to be "the furtherance" of interstate commerce rather than recognize

the extension of the Act, in certain instances, to purely intrastate activities, as did the lower court. This was, perhaps, due to an earlier
Illinois case 2 4 which found a view similar to the one taken by the

Appellate Court to be untenable in the light of existing constitutional
limitations.

The success of the 1939 legislation was dependent upon the ability
of the courts to employ the words of the statute as a means to de-

velop predictability, in the interest of the employee. This predictability has, unfortunately, not been realized, and the confusion and
uncertainty which pre-dated the 1939 amendment continues. This
fact is shown by the large number of cases which continue to be

incorrectly brought under State Compensation Laws, 25 as well as by
21 Ibid.
22 Ernhart v. Elgin, Joliet & Eastern Ry., Docket No. 31162, Ill.
S. Ct.,
November 1949.
23 See note 17, supra.
24 Thomson v. Industrial Commission, 380 Ill.386, 44 N. E. (2d) 19
(1942).
25 For cases incorrectly instituted under Workmen's Compensation, see:
Southern Pacific Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission, 19 Cal. (2d) 271, 120 P.
(2d) 880 (1942), where the worker, when injured, was repairing a combina-
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the variance in the results in related cases. Several instances of this
variance can be shown.
In Thomson v. Industrial Commission,2 6 the court applied the test
of "whether the activity in which the employee is engaged at the
time of the accident, directly or closely and substantially affects interstate commerce." It was then found that a nightwatchman employed
in a yard handling both interstate and intrastate carriers was not
covered by the Act, for the character of his employment could not
be changed by the fact that he was employed by an interstate carrier. It was said that, "To so hold would emasculate the constitutional limitations inherent in the grant of power, as well as the explicit reservations of the tenth amendment." 27 A very similar case
arose in Maryland, 28 when a night watchman was injured while on
duty in a yard which handled both intrastate and interstate commerce. The Maryland court did not feel that any constitutional limitations were pertinent when it ruled, in accord with a previous
case, 29 that "if there is an element of interstate commerce in a traffic or employment it determines the remedy of the employee," and
then proceeded to find that the watchman was covered by the Act.
The test applied in reaching this decision was "whether at the time
of the injury any part of the employee's duties as such was in 'furtherance of interstate or foreign commerce,' or did in any way directly
or closely and substantially affect such commerce." The facts as well
as the test employed by the court were similar in each case, and
yet there was a very real difference in the decisions. The anomaly is
further emphasized by the case of Fitzgerald v. Great Northern
tion truck and boom car which was used to remove obstacles and obstructions
from tracks on which both interstate and intrastate commerce traveled; Rainwater v. Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Ry., 207 La. 681, 21 S. (2d) 872
(1945), where the employee was engaged in loading piling on cars for the
railroad company, destined for use in repairing roadway at various points on

the line and within the state; Harris v. Missouri Pacific Ry., 158 Kan. 679, 149
P. (2d) 342 (1944), where plaintiff's duties were to clean the shop grounds,
haul materials, knock and clean fires and firepans, wash engines, clean out trash

from inside the roundhouse, clean the yards, shovel and clean up dirt, old
papers, waste or anything that he was asked to do outside of the shops;

Albright v. Pennsylvania Ry., 183 Md. 421, 37 A. (2d) 870 (1944), cert. denied,
323 U. S. 735, 65 S. Ct. 72, 89 L. Ed. 589 (1944), where the employee was a

night watchman who guarded both interstate and intrastate shipments; Johnson v. Chicago and North Western Ry., 69 S. D. 111, 7 N. W. (2d) 145 (1942),
where the employee shoveled coal from out of a state carrier into a chute, and
the coal was thereafter used for other interstate carriers.
26 See supra note 24, 44 N. E. (2d) at 23.
27

Ibid.

Albright v. Pennsylvania Ry., 183 Md. 421, 37 A, (2d) 870 (1944),
cert. denied, 323 U. S. 735, 65 S. Ct. 72, 89 L. Ed. 589 (1944).
29
Philadelphia & Reading Ry. v. Polk, 256 U. S. 332, 333, 41 S. Ct.
518, 65 L. Ed. 958 (1921).
28
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Ry., 3 0 which was decided prior to the 1939 amendment. There it
was found that a nightwatchman who protected both intrastate and
interstate carriers was engaged in interstate commerce under the supposedly narrower wording of the 1908 Act. Thus it would seem that
the Minnesota court found the 1908 Act broader before the amendment than the Illinois court did after the amendment.
The distinction between those engaged in construction work and
those engaged in repair work has also received inconsistent treatment.
A federal court in 1942 31 found that an employee engaged in construction under a re-alignment program was within the terms of the
Act, since his work was in furtherance of interstate commerce. It
was said,32 in comparing this employee's work with repair work, that
it is "just as important to place rails as to replace rails." The court
reasoned that it could not be said that the employee did not in any
way further interstate commerce. Thus, new construction on a route
over which interstate commerce had not yet tread was held to be in
Such was not the view taken
furtherance of interstate commerce.
by the Idaho Supreme Court 33 when they distinguished between new
construction and repairs on existing tracks, the former being said to
fall without the purview of the federal statute. The court affirmed
34
the finding of the Industrial Accident Board, and quoted the board:
• . .his duties were wholly in the construction of railroad property
to be at some future time, when completed, put to such service, and,
while said property when completed, became a direct instrumentality
of interstate commerce, claimant's duties in connection therewith involved merely a secondary relation to an interstate instrumentality.
In this case the construction work was a part of a rearrangement
plan which was to increase the efficiency of operations.3 5 The similarity with the Agostino case is striking, and should it be said that
the cases can be distinguished, this would only serve to exemplify
the hair-splitting technicalities which render the Act ineffective.
An interesting situation is also posed by the various recent cases
which deal with workers in and about roundhouses and other related
maintenance facilities. A mechanic's helper, who lost his hand while
working on the stoker of an engine which had been taken from inter157 Minn. 412, 196 N. W. 657 (1923).
Agostino v. Pennsylvania Ry., 50 F. Supp. 726 (E. D. N. Y. 1943).
Id., 50 F. Supp. at 730.
33 Moser v. Union Pacific Ry., 65 Idaho 479, 147 P. (2d) 336 (1944).
30
31
32

34

Id., 147 P.

(2d) at 337.

35 The court cited as authority Gulf, Mobile and Northern Ry. v. Madden,
190 Miss. 374, 200 So. 119, 122 (1941),

where it was said:

".

.

. employees

engaged in the original construction of roadbeds or tracks to be used in interstate commerce are not engaged within the meaning of the statute, while on
the other hand those employed in the repair or maintenance of interstate railroad tracks are within the Act." It is interesting to note that this case was
decided under the Act as it read prior to the amendment.
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state commerce for repairs, was found to be within the Act,386 as was
a worker engaged in making repairs on an interstate freight car. 37
The same was held to be true of a yard repairman, who was electrocuted when coming into contact with a pipe containing shorted
wires, while he was repairing a roundhouse door. 38 Although the
courts in the preceding cases apparently experienced no difficulty in
holding the employee to be in furtherance of interstate commerce, a
New York court applied a contrary rule, and stated: 39
It must be borne in mind that even under the amendment the
duties of the employee must still be in furtherance of interstate commerce.
"Commerce" in this sense has long been interpreted as
meaning "transportation," and the test has been whether the employee's work was directly related to the interstate movement of persons and things in commerce.

The claimants in this case were a blacksmith and two machinists
who were "back shop" employees and who repaired locomotives
which had been 'taken from interstate commerce for extensive repairs. Although this case was reversed by the New York Court of
Appeals, 40 it is apparent that while the applicability of the Act to
such workers was a settled issue in several jurisdictions as early as
1944,41 the question was very much in dispute in New York as late
as 1949.
The Kansas Supreme Court, in the case of Skanks v. Union Pacific
Ry., 42 held that a worker could not recover under state Workmen's

Compensation Laws because he was "a very necessary link in the
chain" of interstate commerce. This workman was filling bags with
sand and placing them on a flatcar. The sandbags were to be used
to retain the waters of a flooding river in order to protect interstate
lines. On the other hand, the Kansas Supreme Court found that a
worker who unloaded coal into a chute was not within the Act even
though the coal had come from another state and was subsequently
used by interstate carriers.43 The court reasoned that the coal had
been removed from the interstate flow of commerce as it had arrived, at the point where the injury occurred, seven or eight days
before. Can it be said, however, that what the man was doing was
not a very necessary link in the chain?
Edwards v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 131 F. (2d) 366 (7th Cir. 1942).
Maxie v. Gulf, Mobile & Ohio R. Co. 358 Mo. 1100, 219 S. W. (2d)
322 (1949), cert. denied, ....
U. S.,
70 S. Ct. 69, 94 L. Ed. 42 (1949).
38 Zimmerman v. Scandrett et al., 57 F. Supp. 799 (E. D. Wis. 1944).
39 Baird v. New York Central Ry., 274 App. Div. 577, 86 N. Y. S. (2d)
54, 56 (1948), rev'd, 299 N. Y. 213, 86 N. E. (2d) 567 (1949). The Court of
Appeals gave impetus to the trend toward greater liberality by reversing the
lower court and finding such "back shop" employees within the Act.
40 See note 39, supra.
41 See notes 36 and 38, supra.
42 155 Kan. 584, 127 P. (2d) 431 (1942).
43 Harris v.Missouri Pacific R. Co., 158 Kan. 679, 149 P. (2d) 342 (1944).
36
37

NOTES
There can be little doubt, in view of the language used by the
44
courts in the foregoing cases, that even the freight claim clerk,
whose duty it was to trace the route traveled by lost interstate freight,
could have been brought within the terms of this statute. It may be
that such work was only remotely connected with interstate commerce; yet this worker was a very necessary link in the chain. The
clerk's work was almost exclusively concerned with the cargo of the
interstate carrier, and it cannot be said that this work was not in
any way in furtherance of interstate commerce.
In 1934 it was estimated that eighty-two per cent of railroad
accidents or injuries occurred in interstate commerce. 45 The proportion probably has risen, but definitely has not declined from that
figure today. The 1939 amendment purports to cover not only this
eighty-two per cent but also any men in the remaining eighteen per
cent who "in any way directly or closely and substantially affect such
commerce." 46 What are the constitutional aspects of this attempt?
Where will this construction offend the reasons proposed by the Supreme Court in holding the original Act unconstitutional? 47 This
is largely a matter of conjecture. But the judicial climate has
changed greatly since 1907, and the Court has already changed its
mind on the proposition that Congress cannot regulate strictly local
affairs that affect interstate commerce. 48 In interpreting the Fair
Labor Standards Act,4 9 there are decisions stretching interstate commerce to cover any activity affecting commerce between the states.
In the McLeod case,50 Justice Murphy said, dissenting: "In using
the phrase 'engaged in commerce' Congress meant to extend the benefits of the Act to employees 'throughout the farthest reaches of the
channels of interstate commerce'."
Even with this extension of what constitutes interstate commerce,
there are still courts that resist the application of the amendment
to intrastate commerce. As witness, note the statement of the Illinois
Supreme Court that: "It seems clear that until Howard v. Illinois
Central Railroad Co., supra, and the Jones & Laughlin case, supra,
are overruled, the amendment in so far as it attempts to include the
employees of interstate carriers at all times, regardless of whether
or not their immediate employment is in interstate commerce or
44 See Holl v. Southern Pacific Co., 71 F. Supp. 21 (N. D. Cal. 1947).
45 See Albertsworth and Cilella, A Proposed New Deal for Interstate Rail%'ay Industrial Harms, 28 ILL. L. REv. 587, 602 (1934).
46 See note 16, supra.

See note 5, supra.
National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301
U. S. 1, 57 S. Ct. 615, 81 L. Ed. 893 (1937); Board of Trade v. Olsen, 262
U. S. 1, 43 S. Ct. 470, 67 L. Ed. 839 (1923).
49 52 STAr. 1060 (1938), 29 U. S. C. § 201 (1946).
47
48

50

See supra, note 14, 319 U. S. at 498.
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affects such commerce is beyond the power of Congress." "I It
would seem that if Congress has the admitted power to regulate
the working conditions of those in the farthest reaches of interstate
commerce, it also has the power to regulate the method for recovery
due to accidents in that employment.
The course of years, plus the tendency of the court to permit
regulation by Congress of affairs that are of a mixed (local and interstate) nature, has practically brought the statute to the same place
occupied by the 1906 Act, which was declared unconstitutional. All
employees of interstate carriers are covered by the Act except those
few who have no contact or influence on interstate commerce. There
are indeed few employees who would be excluded from the Act if it
is logically followed. The ultimate extent of the position that the
Supreme Court now holds with reference to interstate commerce was
shown in the dissent of Justices Lamar, Holmes and Luston in the
Pedersen case: 52
It is conceded that a line must be drawn between those employees
of the carrier who are employed in commerce and those engaged in
other departments of its business. It must be drawn so as to take in,
on one side, those engaged in transportation, which is commerce; otherwise there is no logical reason why it should not include every agent
of the company; for there is no other test by which to determine when
we must sue under the state statute and when under the act of Congree; for if a man on his way to repair a bridge is engaged in interstate commerce, then the man in the shop who made the bolts to be
used in repairing the bridge is likewise so engaged. If they are, then
the man who paid them their wages, and the bookkeeper who entered
those payments in the account are similarly engaged. For they are all
employed by the carrier, and the work of each contributes to its success in hauling freight and passengers.

The statement made by these dissenting judges in 1916 is almost
prophetic of the position now occupied under the amended Act.
Logically, there is no constitutional obstacle to the application of the
Act to any man whose duties affect interstate commerce. The Act
reaches the stage of taking jurisdiction of the person of interstate
employees rather than the acts in which they are engaged. Thus,
the personal jurisdiction follows the employee even when he is engaged in strictly local matters. This taking of jurisdiction of persons
because some duties are in interstate commerce has not yet been
considered by the Supreme Court. But since Congress has plenary
power in interstate commerce and matters affecting such commerce,5 3
it does not appear open to question that Congress could take this
direct, personal jurisdiction rather than pursue the former method
of taking jurisdiction of the machines and instrumentalities and in
this manner indirectly protect the railroad employee. Constitution51 See supra, note 24, 44 N. E. (2d) at 22.
52 See supra, note 10, 229 U. S. at 154.
53 See note 3, supra.

NOTES
ally the Act appears to be on solid ground in assuming authority
where the person, at any time in his employment, affects interstate
commerce rather than attempting to set a requirement that the particular act engaged in at the time of injury be an actual interstate
operation.
Conclusions
The question of what should be done to bring railroad employees
on a par with other industrial workers in recovering for accidents
and injuries has frequently been considered. Three choices seem to
have been proposed:
1. Extend the present Federal Employers' Liability Act to cover
all employees of interstate railroads and to clarify the opera54
tion of the Act.
2. Establish a federal system of Workmen's Compensation to
cover the employees of interstate railroads.55
3. The release by Congress of regulation of the railroad employees, and the integration of such employees into the compensation systems of the various states.5 6
Each of these choices is beset with problems. In the first plan,
that is, the plan for the extension of present legislation, the variances
in interpretation would still vex the application of the statute. The
extension of an antiquated system would only serve to confuse rather
than remedy the situation. The fact that the present system fails
to recognize the now generally accepted principle of liability
without
57
fault in industrial accidents is its greatest drawback.
The establishment of a Federal Workmen's Compensation System,
while it appears desirable in principle would have many ramifications
and difficulties in application. 58 The necessity for centralized operation and uniform awards would cause disparity between local state
awards and federal awards. The variations between sections of the
country could not be adequately met by a central administration
which would cause discrimination against interstate employers, and
consequently, would penalize those engaged in interstate commerce.
The third choice, the release to the State Compensation System,
appears to be the best solution. The various states have systems
HoRoviTz, WORmEm.'S COiaENSATION 69 (1944).
55 Albertsworth and Cileila, A Proposed New Deal for Interstate Railway
Industrial Harms, 28 ILL. L. Rav. 587, 774 (1934); Miller, Workmen's Compensation for Railroad Employees, 2 LoYOLA L. Ray. 138 (1944).
56 Schoene and Watson, Workmen's Compensation on Interstate Railways,
47 HARv. L. REV. 389, 424 (1934).
57 See note 9, supra.
58 New York Central Ry. v. Winfield, 244 U. S. 147, 168, 37 S. Ct. 546,
61 L. Ed. 1045 (1917). Mr. Justice Brandeis, dissenting, points out many disadvantages of a federal system of accident compensation.
54
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functioning now, and with a minimum of disruption they could assume the supervision of all railroad employees within their state
boundaries. The employees would then have the assurance of knowing what their remedy would be at all times. They would be more
assured of receiving compensation for injuries, with less litigation and
lower legal costs. But they would lose any chance to wager on acquiring a large lump sum judgment. 59 This set-back to the gambling nature of some Americans could hardly be treated as a valid objection to
a system that attempts to give prompt, equitable awards with efficient
administration.
The employers would benefit from the consistent, foreseeable extent of the awards rather than the random verdicts of sympathetic
juries. The employers would be able to meet their social obligations
to their employees and their families on an insurance basis rather
than as a result of contentious litigation that only served to injure
their employment relationships and injure their community standing.
The assumption of supervision by the state systems would insure
the conformity of awards to those given to other workers in the
state. The present unfavorable position of railroad workers would
disappear with the integration of this group in the other industries
of the locality. This would accord with the natural law principle
of equal justice for equals. The employment of state boards would
also meet the requirements of the principle of subsidiarity. The use
of the smallest unit -competent to meet the need would insure efficient
administration without unnecessarily removing the operation from the
people to whom it is responsible.
While the state compensation systems can still be improved, they
have had a sufficient period to show their utility. They have been
generally accepted by employers and employees as a just means of
meeting the toll of human misery that is concomitant with industrial
development. Their extension to the interstate railroad field would
serve to bring the fruits of the system to the men who gave impetus
to such legislation in earlier years.
F. Richard Kramer
George J. Murphy, Jr.
59 $40,000 for injury to spine: see note 19, supra; $40,000 for loss of a
leg: Cunningham v. Pennsylvania Ry., 55 F. Supp. 1012 (E. D. N. Y. 1944);
$35,000 for severe injuries suffered while getting off an engine: Michael v. Reading Co., 82 F. Supp. 54 (E. D. Pa. 1948), aff'd., 174 F. (2d) 828 (1949);
$40,000 to brakeman for injury causing temporarily paralyzed legs plus necessity to wear a brace: Hannigan v. Elgin, J. & E. Ry., 337 Ill. App. 538, 86
N. E. (2d) 388 (1949); $47,500 to thirty-five year old fireman for rib and
vertebrae fractures that incapacitated him for twenty years: Henderson v.
Pennsylvania Ry., 338 Ill. App. 653, 88 N. E. (2d) 95 (1949); $7,500 for
rupture of stomach ulcer while turning switch: St. Louis & San Francisco R.
Co. v. Dyson, .... Miss., 43 S. (2d) 95 (1949).

